Graffiti, Speech, and Crime by Carroll, Jenny E.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2019
Graffiti, Speech, and Crime
Jenny E. Carroll
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carroll, Jenny E., "Graffiti, Speech, and Crime" (2019). Minnesota Law Review. 73.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/73
  
 
1285 
Article 
Graffiti, Speech, and Crime 
Jenny E. Carroll† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Graffiti resides at the uncomfortable intersection of criminal 
law and free speech. Graffiti is not the shout of revolution to the 
gathered, protesting masses,1 or the political pamphlet flung 
from a 1920s window.2 It is not the obscene-rendered-political-
 
†  Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis Professor of Law, University of Al-
abama School of Law. Thanks to Adam Steinman, Ronald Krotoszkynski, Rus-
sell Weaver, RonNell Andersen Jones, Jack Balkin, Richard Delgado, Jean 
Stefancic, Paul Horwitz, Kate Levine, Cynthia Lee, Michael Cahill, Alice Ris-
troph, Andrew Ferguson, Thomas Kadri, Kay Levine, Patti Callahan Henry, 
Jocelyn Simonson, Corrina Lain, Allison Anna Tait, Stephen Rushin, Eric Mil-
ler, Nirej Sekhorn, Russell Dean Covey, Lauren Sedall Lucas, Stephanie Shaw, 
Morgan Cloud, participants at CrimFest 2017, faculty colloquium participants 
at the University of Alabama School of Law and the University of Richmond 
School of Law, First Amendment Scholar events at Yale University, the Louis 
D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville, University Paris 1 
Panthéon-Sorbonne, Pázmány Péter Catholic University (Hungary), and the 
Southeast Criminal Law Scholars meeting 2018. Thanks also to the graffiti art-
ists who spoke to me about their work in the process of this paper. Finally, 
thanks to the careful editing of Tash Bottum, Jordan Dritz, and the students at 
Minnesota Law Review. All errors are of course my own, but Tash and Jordan’s 
thoughtful comments and suggestions were always greatly appreciated. Copy-
right © 2019 by Jenny E. Carroll. 
 1. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1919) (upholding a 
conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 for a public speech that incited in-
terference with World War I recruitment). 
 2. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (holding that the 
throwing of pamphlets that called for a strike of U.S. war efforts was a violation 
of the Espionage Act of 1917). 
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jacketed protest of war,3 or a flag set aflame in the name of re-
claiming patriotism.4 It is an illicit scrawl.5 It is damage and de-
fiance rolled into one from the moment of its creation. It occupies 
a small, unpopular, legally-derided space. It is the easiest of hard 
First Amendment decisions. When asked to choose between the 
tag that appears in the middle of the night on someone else’s 
property and the possibility that the tag might enjoy an embed-
ded meaning, First Amendment jurisprudence does not blink. It 
does not falter or wax philosophical about the values of equality 
or democracy or the utility of a free marketplace of ideas. It 
blesses the criminalization of the act and so the words that com-
prise the act. In this quiet (and quieting) moment, the law takes 
a knee. It relinquishes some larger promise of First Amendment 
doctrine and elevates the value of property, in the process closing 
any corridor for a free speech defense. 
At first blush, this might seem the right result. Criminal law 
regulates graffiti as a property or nuisance offense.6 Not only 
does graffiti damage the physical space upon which it is placed, 
but according to policing theorists, it signals a subdermal law-
lessness that will lead to greater harm if left unchecked.7 
Whether a mere tag or an elaborate mural, graffiti debases and 
undermines property rights. The focus on property damage 
tends to preclude free speech defenses that might be available to 
other criminalized speech.8 Unlike cross-burners or political in-
citers or even the purveyors of the obscene, taggers have been 
unable to claim as their defense that their speech has some value 
or that it warrants some First Amendment shelter even in face 
of competing criminal law. 
 
 3. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (“[A]bsent a more par-
ticularized and compelling reason for its actions, the state may not, consistent 
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display 
here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense.”). 
 4. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419–20 (1989) (holding that John-
son’s burning of the American flag was protected speech under the First Amend-
ment). 
 5. The Oxford English Dictionary defines graffiti as “[w]riting or drawings 
scribbled, scratched, or sprayed illicitly on a wall or other surface in a public 
place.” Graffiti, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, www.oed.com/ 
viewdictionaryentry/Entry/80475 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). 
 6. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (outlining the various city or-
dinances that criminalize graffiti). 
 7. See infra notes 105–40 and accompanying text (explaining, in the con-
text of the “broken windows” theory, that graffiti in neighborhoods can repre-
sent crime, deviation, and lack of police presence). 
 8. See infra notes 98, 106–40 and accompanying text, discussing criminal-
ization of graffiti based on property damage theories. 
  
2019] GRAFFITI, SPEECH, & CRIME 1287 
 
On closer examination, precluding a speech defense for graf-
fiti is at odds with First Amendment doctrine. The First Amend-
ment categorizes personal liberties of speech, religion, press, and 
association as negative rights.9 Confronted with other rights and 
interests, the law attempts to balance those rights and interests 
against the values enshrined in the First Amendment. In the 
context of free speech doctrine, the Court and scholars have at-
tempted to construct careful calibrations of where one right or 
interest should begin and where another must end. In reality, 
rights inevitably bleed into one another—in our modern, inter-
connected world, more so than ever. Wedding cakes become 
speech and religion and property.10 Healthcare becomes privacy 
and religion.11 Money itself becomes speech, property, and asso-
ciation.12 No neat lines divide one fundamental right from an-
other. Instead, rights to property, speech, religion, privacy, and 
 
 9. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 10. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. 
Ct. 2290, 2290 (2017) (granting certiorari). In Masterpiece Cakeshop, petitioner 
argued that cake created in his shop was his speech and represented his reli-
gious beliefs. See also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S.Ct. 1719, 1726 (2018); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 
294 (Colo. App. 2015) (noting that the State’s anti-discrimination law’s “pro-
scription of sexual orientation discrimination by places of public accommodation 
is a reasonable regulation that does not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719; Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Contem-
plating Masterpiece Cakeshop, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 86 (2017) (dis-
cussing the significance of the Masterpiece Cakeshop case and expansion of First 
Amendment speech doctrines to objects and services). 
 11. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court linked 
healthcare and privacy, recognizing a marital right to privacy that in turn pre-
vented state bans on contraception. Id. at 485–86. More recently, the Trump 
administration has directly linked notions of privacy, healthcare and religion 
with the creation of the Conscience and Religious Freedom Division within the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. See Juliet Eilpern & Ariana 
Eunjung Cha, New HHS Civil Rights Division to Shield Health Workers with 
Moral or Religious Objections, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trump-administration-creating 
-civil-rights-division-to-shield-health-workers-with-moral-or-religious 
-objections/2018/01/17/5663d1c0-fbe2-11e7-8f662df0b94bb98a_story.html? 
utm_term=.fed9e5f1605f (describing the creation of the new Conscience and Re-
ligious Freedom Division within the U.S. Health and Human Services Depart-
ment to “ease the way for doctors, nurses and other medical professionals to opt 
out of providing services that violate their moral or religious beliefs”). 
 12. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 430–32 
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association mix and mingle in an alchemy of identity, equality, 
and liberty. 
In this blending and balancing of rights, those most on the 
periphery of power are the most vulnerable.13 As the Supreme 
Court heralds a new era of First Amendment rights preserved 
by access to the airwaves, technology, and ever widening forums 
of communication, the bind between speech rights and access to 
resources is renewed and reinforced.14 Those with property enjoy 
wider freedom of speech. Those with funds may purchase adver-
tising time and space. Those with real property may display 
their beliefs or host events to promote such beliefs. In contrast, 
the speech of those without property is increasingly marginal-
ized and, in the case of graffiti artists and activists, criminalized. 
For these marginalized speakers, law turns away from its 
careful blending of rights practiced in other speech realms and 
draws a hard line. Graffiti is calculated in terms of the damage 
it causes and not in terms of the speech value it may contain.15 
A Banksy is criminalized in the same way as a smashed window 
or a trenched lawn. Criminal law leaves no space for Banksy’s 
artistic or political content. Unlike other forms of speech that 
may be criminalized for their eventual effect or their violation of 
some content-neutral regulation, graffiti is just damage. 
In this dark boundary between property interests preserved 
by criminal law and speech interests at the heart of the First 
Amendment lurks a complex, overlooked reality. While there can 
be no doubt that graffiti damages property in ways other speech 
may not, there can also be no doubt that some graffiti carries 
with it a voice and identity absent in other forums of speech. To 
deny any possibility of a speech defense to graffiti is therefore to 
deny the potential speech value of graffiti and to ignore the 
heavy lift that graffiti—and other forms of illicit speech—may do 
in a society that is increasingly allegiant to property and power. 
 
(2010) (holding that the government cannot suppress political speech by limit-
ing contributions by corporations to political advertising and equating money 
itself to speech). 
 13. See Amanda Manjarrez, Note, States Must Protect Issue Advocacy in a 
Post-Citizens United World, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 219, 233 (2017) (noting 
that one effect of the Citizens United decision was the skyrocketing of money, 
largely coming from wealthy corporate interest groups or political nonprofits, 
being funneled in to influence political elections). 
 14. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 430–32 (holding that monetary dona-
tions were equivalent to speech). 
 15. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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To understand this argument is to examine the entwined re-
lationship of the First Amendment, criminal law, and property 
rights. It is to consider that subversive speech such as graffiti—
even as it damages property and impedes on other sacred 
rights—may carry a speech value that is worth defending.16 
Treating graffiti as a mere property offense ignores the increas-
ingly vital corridor of communication and civic engagement that 
illicit speech such as graffiti opens. The value of graffiti as 
speech is tied not only to its explicit message, but to its status as 
outsider or marginalized speech. The medium is itself part of the 
communication. 
Artists and activists alike have long recognized this reality. 
In one portion of her politically-charged video for Formation, Be-
yoncé juxtaposed a hoodie-clad Black child dancing in front of a 
line of riot police.17 The child raises his hands, and as the police 
follow suit, the camera pans away to a white cinder-block wall 
spray-painted with the words “Stop Shooting Us.”18 The juxtapo-
sition is jarring: the child dancing, the unmoving police; the for-
mality of the officers, the informality of the graffiti.19 The mes-
sage is clear. Beyond the literal words, that Beyoncé chose 
 
 16. See infra notes 46–80 and accompanying text (noting that graffiti often 
carries the messages of political-dissent movements, resistance groups, and so-
cially, politically, and economically marginalized young people). 
 17. Beyoncé Knowles-Carter, Formation, BEYONCE (Feb. 6, 2016), http:// 
www.beyonce.com/formation. 
 18. Id. The video, and the song, have garnered significant criticism for con-
taining an “anti-police” message, particularly in the scene described. See Lisa 
Respers France, Protests Planned Against and For Beyoncé, CNN (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/09/entertainment/beyonce-boycott-super-bowl 
-feat (explaining that those who were opposed to Beyoncé’s Formation perfor-
mance were to gather outside of NFL headquarters in New York City to protest); 
Lisa Respers France, Why the Beyoncé Controversy Is Bigger than You Think, 
CNN (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/23/entertainment/beyonce 
-controversy-feat/index.html (noting the mixed reactions viewers had to Be-
yoncé’s Formation performance); Carma Hassan et al. Police Union Calls for 
Law Enforcement Labor to Boycott Beyoncé World Tour, CNN (Feb. 20, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/19/us/beyonce-police-boycott (noting critics objec-
tions to Beyoncé’s Formation performance due to its #BlackLivesMatter 
themes); Ashley Lutz, People Are Calling for a Beyoncé Boycott After Her Super 
Bowl Song Sends Harsh Message to the Police, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2016), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/beyonce-super-bowl-formation-song-anti 
-police-2016-2 (noting that Beyoncé’s music video features a police car sinking 
into a flood). Without commenting on the validity of this critique, the existence 
of the critique suggests the scene played a vital role consistent with traditional 
speech’s role in the deliberative democracy. 
 19. See Jon Carmanica et al., Beyoncé in ‘Formation’: Entertainer, Activist, 
Both?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/arts/ 
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graffiti to make the statement conveys the outsider status of the 
words themselves. 
To speak this way is an act of defiance, a rejection of the very 
notion of the narrow forums of acceptable speech. Yet when used 
this way, graffiti—even this simple, spray-painted text—is un-
questionably a form of speech. The regulation of that speech 
raises First Amendment concerns that implicate not only the tra-
ditional questions of who may speak and how, but also questions 
about the link between economic power, criminal law, free 
speech rights, and the narratives of justice and power in the 
United States. 
In a post-9/11 and a post-Citizens United world, in which 
concerns about security corral speech rights and where many 
fear that wealth will drive access to the remaining forums of po-
litical speech, graffiti occupies a vital space. Its very method of 
creation renders it a tool of the powerless and the economically 
disenfranchised. To the most marginal of marginalized voices, it 
is a means of resistance. To over-police marginalized speech such 
as graffiti is to risk removing a vital avenue of expression in 
some communities.20 As Beyoncé and any street activist would 
tell you, the act of graffiti carries a power all its own. It rejects 
the notion that speech must be cabined and confined, relying in-
stead on its rebel status to communicate and, in the process, to 
undermine free speech doctrine’s previous allegiance to desig-
nated forums and deference to property interests.21 
This Article is therefore a defense of speech that in its very 
creation is a criminal act. More precisely, it argues that permit-
ting an affirmative free speech defense to graffiti prosecutions 
facilitates community evaluation of the proper balance between 
 
music/beyonce-formation-super-bowl-video.html (discussing the symbolism and 
imagery of Beyoncé’s Formation video and Super Bowl performance). 
 20. See JEFF FERRELL, CRIMES OF STYLE: URBAN GRAFFITI AND THE POLI-
TICS OF CRIMINALITY 171, 176 (1996) (“The writing of graffiti . . . unfolds within 
the system of legal and economic domination, systems which guarantee unequal 
access to private property and cultural resources.”); Margaret L. Mettler, Note, 
Graffiti Museum: A First Amendment Argument for Protecting Uncommissioned 
Art on Private Property, 111 MICH. L. REV. 249, 274–75 (2012) (noting that un-
like other forms of speech, some graffiti presents messages that lack viable al-
ternative forums of expression); Kelly P. Welch, Note, Graffiti and the Consti-
tution: A First Amendment Analysis of the Los Angeles Tagging Crew Injunction, 
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2011) (noting the evolution of graffiti in the Los 
Angeles area from vandalism to political expression and ethnic and racial iden-
tification). 
 21. See Welch, supra note 20, at 207–09 (describing graffiti’s role in pushing 
accepted speech boundaries and quoting Los Angeles graffiti artist Cristian 
Gheorghiu, also known as Smear, that graffiti is “crime transformed into art”). 
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speech and property. Allowing such a defense would not only rec-
ognize the value of the expressive component of graffiti, but it 
would open a space for an alternative narrative about speech, 
power, and property rights. Ultimately, citizen jurors would 
weigh the graffiti’s speech value in the context of the criminal 
case before them.22 In this, defendants and jurors make choices 
about the stories law can and should hear. 
Permitting an affirmative free speech defense in the case of 
graffiti is hardly a get-out-of-jail-free card. Juror demographics 
suggest a juror is more likely to align herself with a property 
owner than with a defendant who spray-painted the side of a 
building. Such a juror may find the graffiti and its purported 
claim of speech not credible or even offensive. The juror might 
conclude that graffiti not only damages the physical property but 
also threatens the sanctity of the neighborhood itself. Even if the 
juror finds some artistic, social, or political merit in the graffiti, 
she may still reject the defense in favor of property interests. 
There would also be a very real possibility that speech-based 
challenges to graffiti charges will rise or fall on the content of the 
speech itself, with more favored messages more likely to receive 
a sympathetic ear from jurors than less favored, or outright of-
fensive, messages. Such risks are not exclusive to graffiti,23 and 
they do not justify wholesale preclusion of a free-speech defense. 
Moreover, by creating a forum for citizens serving as jurors to 
weigh in on the competing values of speech and property, a 
speech defense to graffiti promotes not only free speech, but also 
democratic values and citizen-driven law. 
In addition, this Article challenges the prevailing doctrinal 
compromise that values different voices—even dissenting ones—
 
 22. While most cases in the criminal system do not ultimately proceed to a 
jury trial, this does not mean that a defense does not affect outcome or that a 
jury verdict, however rare, does not influence charging decisions and plea offers 
in other cases. The creation of a free speech defense to graffiti signals a shift in 
legislative treatment of the conduct or harm. From a prosecutor’s perspective, 
the existence of this new defense also signals new avenues of litigation that may 
consume precious prosecutorial or judicial resources. Both may influence charg-
ing decisions on the front end of the case and/or incentivize plea bargaining on 
the back end of the case. Even if few cases proceed to trial, acquittals in cases 
that do proceed to a jury under the proposed defense could affect charging deci-
sions or plea offers in the cases that followed. In this, the defense pushes law’s 
narrative regardless of whether or not the case actually goes to a jury. 
 23. See generally CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PAS-
SION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003) (describing the effect of 
human bias on criminal verdicts). 
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only so long as those voices remain in designated and constitu-
tionally accepted boundaries. Even while recognizing the im-
portance of different and dissenting speech, the Court and schol-
ars argue that such speech must abide by designated rules and 
exist in designated forums.24 Dissenters must follow the rules 
created by the very system they challenge. This is particularly 
evident in the regulation of graffiti—speech that seeks to claim 
unsanctioned spaces and, in that process, to raise unsanctioned 
voices.25 
This Article has four components. Part I considers the value 
of graffiti. Part II turns to the criminal regulation of graffiti. Part 
III considers the construction of “free speech” as a First Amend-
ment doctrine and the underlying values that drive the doctrine. 
Finally, Part IV discusses the affirmative speech defense to crim-
inal charges stemming from graffiti, and how such a defense pro-
motes free speech interests. To be sure, the scope of this Article’s 
concluding argument is limited. It does not contend that it 
should be impossible to criminalize graffiti or that property in-
terests should never be protected under criminal law. Nor, as 
noted above, does this Article contend that all graffiti has equal 
speech value, or even any speech value at all. What this Article 
does argue is that in the process of criminalizing graffiti, Amer-
ican criminal law has overlooked any value that graffiti may 
have as speech and thereby endorsed a body of law that promotes 
private property interests at the expense of individual liberty. In 
the context of graffiti, this is particularly perilous. Graffiti, with 
its outsider status, carries a potential to introduce an unbounded 
and previously excluded voice. While this voice may not always 
be worthy of protection, it is certainly worthy of consideration. 
I.  WHY GRAFFITI MATTERS   
Graffiti may vary widely in its form or content. But regard-
less of its presentation, at its creation it is an act of defiance.26 A 
graffiti artist claims a space—either permanently or temporar-
ily—that is not his or her own. Part of graffiti’s meaning lies in 
 
 24. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) (“[T]he First and Four-
teenth Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to 
every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any form 
of address in any circumstances that he chooses.”). 
 25. See FERRELL, supra note 20, at 178–86 (describing the anarchist tradi-
tion of graffiti as a means of rejecting authoritarianism and majoritarian aes-
thetics). 
 26. Id. at 176 (“Graffiti writing . . . constitutes a sort of anarchist resistance 
to cultural domination . . . .”). 
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this act of appropriation, in the rejection of the notion that 
speech must be cabined and confined.27 These artists rely on 
graffiti’s rebel status both to communicate their message and, in 
the process, to undermine the free speech doctrine’s purported 
allegiance to designated forums and civil speech.28 
As a general rule, free speech and criminal law scholars typ-
ically have very little to say about graffiti.29 It is a nuisance, and 
it is regulated as such. Even with the commodification of graffiti 
as art or fashion—as in the cases of Basquiat,30 Banksy,31 Molly 
Crabapple,32 and Gucci’s Graffiti Ghost33—graffiti is more likely 
to be described as a menace than as valued speech.34 
But there is something powerful in speech that claims a 
physical space as a physical space. To embed speech on an object 
is not only to alter and to claim the object itself, but to transcend 
the impermanence of spoken word and to defy all forces that 
would silence or erase the uttered thought. This status as word-
rendered-physical-object is a double-edged sword, however. In 
 
 27. See Welch, supra note 20, at 207–09 (describing graffiti as challenging 
traditional classifications of speech). 
 28. Id. at 208 (noting the role of graffiti as both crime and art); FERRELL, 
supra note 20, at 174–76 (arguing that graffiti pushes back on traditional free 
speech doctrine that dictates parameters of speech in terms of time, place, and 
manner, if not content and aesthetic). 
 29. There is, however, a growing body of literature on the topic of graffiti in 
the context of free speech and crime. See, e.g., Mettler, supra note 20, at 258 
(discussing First Amendment protection of uncommissioned art). 
 30. See Jean-Michel Basquiat: American Painter, THE ART STORY: MODERN 
ART INSIGHT, https://www.theartstory.org/artist-basquiat-jean-michel.htm 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2018) (describing Basquiat as a New York graffiti artist who 
worked in the international art gallery scene). 
 31. See Will Ellsworth-Jones, The Story Behind Banksy, SMITHSONIAN.COM 
(Feb. 2013), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-story-behind 
-banksy-4310304 (“On his way to becoming an international icon, the subversive 
and secretive street artist turned the art world upside-down.”). 
 32. See Ron Rosenbaum, Meet Molly Crabapple, an Artist, Activist, Re-
porter, and Fire-Eater All in One, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 2016), https://www 
.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/molly-crabapple-artist-arctivist-reporter 
-fire-eater-180958502 (outlining the artist’s career as an artist and activist in 
the Middle East). 
 33. See Daniel Syrek, Meet GucciGhost – The Graffiti Artist Turned Fashion 
Star, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/style/ 
sc-fashion-1107-gucci-ghost-interview-20161101-story.html (noting that the 
New York street artist “skyrocketed into the international fashion strato-
sphere”). 
 34. See CDH, Notes on the Commodification of Street Art, 263 ART 
MONTHLY AUSTL. 42 (Sept. 2013), http://www.cdh-art.com/Writing/CDH%20A 
MA%20Notes%20on%20the%20commodification%20of%20street%20art.pdf 
(describing the complicated treatment of street art as both “art” and crime). 
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its physical manifestation, this speech is subjected to a class of 
regulation that the spoken word may elude. A book can be 
burned.35 Newspaper offices raided.36 Printing presses 
smashed.37 Walls whitewashed.38 The written word or painted 
image erased. In the process those who claimed the physical 
space with their speech face a vulnerability a speaker may avoid. 
Words spoken alone may be difficult to attribute or to prove with-
out a physical record. A charge of a threat uttered in private may 
dissolve in the face of the inevitable and often insurmountable 
proof dilemma of what he said versus what she now claims. 
Physical words are different. They occupy a permanent, or 
semi-permanent, state in which an author or artist claims both 
the speech and the space upon which the speech is placed. There 
is a physical record and so a different possibility of regulation by 
the State—one grounded in theories of property and owner-
ship.39 Because of this possibility of criminal prosecution for an 
offense against property, the act of claiming a physical space for 
certain types of speech becomes an act of disobedience itself. It 
is to claim, literally and physically, the realm claimed by another 
and to mark it as one’s own. 
As lofty as free speech debates often are in championing the 
speech of dissent, change, equality, or liberty, they often overlook 
what is simultaneously the most humble, defiant, and common 
presentation of conduct, rendered speech, and speech rendered 
physical—graffiti.40 Long the scourge of urban centers and rural 
 
 35. See generally REBECCA KNUTH, BURNING BOOKS AND LEVELING LI-
BRARIES: EXTREMIST VIOLENCE AND CULTURE DESTRUCTION (2006) (describing 
the history of book burning as a means for suppressing dissenting perspectives). 
 36. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERI-
ENCE 90–92 (1998) (describing control of the press by the government). See gen-
erally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM 
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004) (describing con-
trol of speech in the promotion of national security interests). 
 37. See JONATHAN ROSE, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE BOOK: DESTRUCTION 
AND PRESERVATION (2008) (describing historical policies of destroying methods 
of publishing anti-Majoritarian sentiment). 
 38. See Welch, supra note 20, at 207 (describing Los Angeles graffiti abate-
ment ordinances that require property owners to paint over or remove graffiti). 
 39. See infra notes 98, 106–40 and accompanying text (discussing criminal-
ization of graffiti based on property damage theories). 
 40. Even Steven H. Shiffrin’s groundbreaking book, DISSENT, INJUSTICE 
AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA, which examined neglected forums of dissent 
and alternative avenues of communication, focused on methods of speech far 
more traditional than graffiti. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE 
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abandoned property alike, graffiti is among the most criminally 
regulated speech in the United States. It is typically regulated 
as a “nuisance”—a catchall damage-to-property-style offense 
with relatively few elements41—or a “trespass”—a common-law 
property offense that contemplates an unlawful entry but no ad-
ditional harm.42 
Enforcement of such anti-graffiti sentiment has served 
three primary functions. First, it regulates, and in theory deters, 
the undeniable property damage that graffiti can cause, either 
by harming the property physically or by undermining the prop-
erty rights of the owner.43 Such property interests are impeded 
regardless of the graffiti’s artistic value or merit.44 Second, it has 
 
AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999) (discussing, throughout the text, dis-
senting alternative speech such as flag burning, the arts, and commercial 
speech). 
 41. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 86 (5th ed. 1984) (describing the common law concept of nuisance as a 
“catchword” action and the evolution of civil and criminal regulation of nui-
sance). For examples of nuisance statutes, see, for example, ARIZ. REV. STAT 
§ 13-2908 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (1872); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-
4-501 (West 2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-1.3 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 17, § 806 (1992); NEV. STAT. § 206.310 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:2 
(2013); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304 (West 2006); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 28.03 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-106 (West 2012) (all general 
property damage statutes). 
 42. See George F. Deiser, The Development of Principle in Trespass, 27 
YALE L.J. 220, 232–34 (1917); George E. Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of 
Trespass, 34 YALE L.J. 343, 358 (1925) (both describing the historical develop-
ment of criminal trespass). For examples of different constructions of trespass 
statutes, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4b-11 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 810.08 (2000); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-7-21 (2001); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:63 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-17-87 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.200 (West 2009) (all trespass 
statutes). 
 43. See infra notes 98, 112–40 and accompanying text (explaining that graf-
fiti is an affront to the owner’s ability to control access and content on her prop-
erty). 
 44. A multi-million dollar Banksy mural is, in theory, subject to the same 
regulation as a spray-painted tag proclaiming that the “Eagles Rule” or that 
“John ’s Samantha 4-ever” (both of which are readily available for viewing in 
some iteration on almost any interstate highway overpass). See Banksy Liver-
pool Murals Sold for £3.2m to Qatari Buyer, BBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2017), http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-merseyside-41351209. For a discussion of the 
current trend in street art popularity, see Popularity of Street Art, ART PRICE, 
https://www.artprice.com/artprice-reports/the-contemporary-art-market-report 
-2017/popularity-of-street-art (last visited Oct. 29, 2018) (listing Banksy sales 
in 2017 as totaling in excess of $6 million). 
As will be discussed further in Part II, criminal regulation as a general 
matter is unconcerned with the content or quality of the graffiti, though cer-
tainly prosecutorial discretion may produce different results for the two pieces. 
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served as a convenient basis to detain (and with increasing reg-
ularity to punish) youthful offenders ranging from disaffected 
teens to suspected gang members.45 Finally, it has been em-
ployed to dismantle or contain political-dissent movements rang-
ing from Operation Life to Occupy Wall Street to Black Lives 
Matter.46 
In this the value of graffiti as speech emerges. Not only may 
some graffiti carry artistic merit, but some graffiti may also 
serve critical social and political functions that elude other forms 
of speech.47 Just as graffiti is regulated for the property damage 
 
 45. Many graffiti ordinances are targeted specifically at youth and/or po-
tential gang members. See CAL. COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STATE TASK 
FORCE ON YOUTH GANG VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 9 (1986) (noting that graffiti 
carries an implicit threat to communities of gang and youth violence); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GANG PROSECUTION MANUAL 5–12 (2009), https://www 
.nationalgangcenter.gov/content/documents/gang-prosecution-manual.pdf (cit-
ing graffiti as indicia of gang activity); see also, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE 
ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.1(C) (2009) (“[T]he spread of graffiti often leads to vio-
lence, genuine threats to life, and the perpetuation of gangs, gang violence, and 
gang territories.”); GIG HARBOR, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 9.39.030(B)(2) 
(2018) (creating a stand-alone offense for minors caught with implements of 
graffiti, including broad tipped markers). Increasingly, juvenile courts are rec-
ognizing graffiti as one of the most frequently charged offenses among youthful 
offender populations. See Nancy Fishman, Youth Court as an Option for Crimi-
nal Court Diversion, 83 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., 38, 39 (2011) (noting that the types 
of cases involving youthful offenders are often graffiti-related); John R. Lewis, 
Tough Legislation Aims to Wipe Out the ‘Tagging’ Epidemic, L.A. TIMES, March 
21, 1993, at B15 (defining a “tagger” as a young person engaged in the vandal-
ism of property, who is not necessarily a gang member, and noting that graffiti 
arrests provide a mechanism by which to detain and question youth). 
Beyond this, scholars have noted that graffiti prosecutions are targeted at 
minority actors as a means of controlling behavior. See Jeff Ferrell, Trying to 
Make Us a Parking Lot: Petit Apartheid, Cultural Space, and the Public Negoti-
ation of Ethnicity, in PETIT APARTHEID IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
THE DARK FIGURE OF RACISM 55, 60 (Dragan Milovanovic & Katheryn K. Rus-
sell eds., 2001) (arguing that arrests and prosecutions for graffiti serve as a 
means of targeting Black and Latinx youth). 
Richard Delgado has also posited the theory that such offenses serve as a 
“basis” for arrest, but also that there is a different perception of their “danger-
ousness” based on the actor. A young Black man who tags a building may be 
perceived by police officers as a greater threat than an affluent white teenager 
in a suburb. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, 
White Fears – On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503, 509–12 
(1994) (narrating that certain groups of people are depicted as violent or prone 
to crime). 
 46. See, e.g., Corrine Segal, Projection Artist Brings Light to Social Issues 
with Attention-Grabbing Protests, PBS NEWS HOUR (Sept. 17, 2017), https:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/arts/projection-light-artists-protest (describing the 
work and repeated arrest of graffiti projectionist Illuminator). 
 47. See, e.g., Joe Austin, Knowing Their Place: Local Knowledge, Social 
Prestige, and the Writing in Formation in New York City, in GENERATIONS OF 
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it causes, so too does it strike a blow against traditional property 
constructions and notions of worth and identity linked to prop-
erty ownership.48 Emerging wealth gaps in the United States 
highlight in painful detail that increasingly we are a nation of 
owners and non-owners, of gentrified neighborhoods and priced 
out tenants.49 Coupled with the dominant notion that speech is 
linked to property ownership, with speech rights pivoting around 
access to property and shrinking public forums,50 graffiti and 
other forms of illicit speech give voice to movements that are oth-
erwise pushed out by dominant speech doctrine.51 Beyond this, 
graffiti, in claiming a physical space, pushes back on not only 
notions of ownership, but also neighborhood identity.52 
The graffiti movements of the 1980s and 1990s sought to re-
claim urban spaces that were increasingly fractured by gentrifi-
 
YOUTH: YOUTH CULTURES AND HISTORY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 240, 
240–50 (Joe Austin & Michael Nevin Willard eds., 1998) (describing the role of 
graffiti in marginalized youth identity). 
 48. See FERRELL, supra note 20, at 176 (noting that “[g]raffiti writing 
breaks the hegemonic hold of corporate/governmental style over the urban en-
vironment and the situations of daily life . . . it interrupts the pleasant, efficient 
uniformity of ‘planned’ urban space and predictable urban living . . . [and] graf-
fiti disrupts the lived experience of mass culture, the passivity of mediated con-
sumption.”). Graffiti artists often describe their underlying goals as marking 
their existence. See MICHAEL WALSH, GRAFFITO 34–35 (1996) (quoting Omar, a 
graffiti artist, “[h]ow many people can walk through a city and prove they were 
there? [My tag is] a sign I was here. My hand made this mark. I’m fucking 
alive!”). 
 49. See Christopher Ingraham, The Richest 1 Percent Now Owns More of 
the Country’s Wealth Than at Any Time In the Past 50 Years, WASH. POST (Dec. 
6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/06/the 
-richest-1-percent-now-owns-more-of-the-countrys-wealth-than-at-any-time-in 
-the-past-50-years (discussing wealth and ownership gaps in the American 
economy). 
 50. See Rowley Rice, Note, We Are Not Interested: How Dominant Political 
Parties Use Campaign Finance Law to Lock Interest Groups and Third Parties 
Out of the System, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 917, 939–47 (2016) (comparing U.S. and 
British systems of campaign finance reform and the particular effect of Citizens 
United on speech forums and speech). 
 51. See TRICIA ROSE, BLACK NOISE: RAP MUSIC AND BLACK CULTURE IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 34–36 (1994) (chronicling the links between gentrifi-
cation and urban revitalization in New York City and the importance of graffiti 
to emerging Hip Hop culture). See generally STEPHEN J. POWERS, ART OF GET-
TING OVER: GRAFFITI AT THE MILLENNIUM (1999) (examining the works, stories, 
and messages of numerous graffiti artists and writers); JANICE RAHN, PAINTING 
WITHOUT PERMISSION: GRAFFITI SUBCULTURE (2002) (discussing the important 
role of graffiti as a method of claiming urban identity). 
 52. See ROSE, supra note 51, at 33–34. 
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cation and policing theories that overly regulated poor neighbor-
hoods and their largely of color populations.53 Particularly in 
large cities like New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago and San 
Diego, urban revitalization policies often declared the neighbor-
hoods of poor and of color individuals “slums” and relocated res-
idents.54 The end product was not only the gentrification of the 
“slum” neighborhoods, but also the splintering of relocated Black 
and Latinx communities.55 Left with limited city resources or po-
litical power, these fractured communities relied on illicit speech 
including graffiti to preserve their identity in the midst of an 
emerging urban reality that sought to render them irrelevant or 
invisible.56 
Graffiti has also functioned as a mechanism of resistance—
not only to particular political, social, or religious authorities, 
but also to the very structures that might segregate and confine 
communities.57 This resistance may be literal. Graffiti pushes 
back against the physical structure of an urban landscape that 
grows increasingly homogenous as private space is maximized 
through skyscrapers and multi-storied structures, while public 
spaces are minimized and depersonalized.58 The resistance may 
 
 53. See FERRELL, supra note 20, at 3–16 (describing the rise of urban graf-
fiti movements in response to the division of traditionally poor and often Black 
or Latinx neighborhoods). Ferrell notes that in such neighborhoods, and 
throughout the cities in question, graffiti served as a means of not only reclaim-
ing specific spaces but of signaling a continued existence even as old neighbor-
hoods were undermined in the name of gentrification and urban policing poli-
cies. Id. 
 54. See ROSE, supra note 51, at 30–34 (describing this phenomenon in the 
Bronx, Bedford Stuyvesant and Harlem in New York City). This phenomenon 
is not isolated to New York, or even the United States. Graffiti has proliferated 
throughout the world as method of expressing resistance and identity. See Jeff 
Ferrell, Urban Graffiti: Crime, Control and Resistance, 27 YOUTH & SOC’Y 73, 
73 (1995). 
 55. See ROSE, supra note 51, at 33–34. 
 56. Id. at 34 (arguing that “[a]lthough city leaders and the popular press 
had literally and figuratively condemned the South Bronx neighborhoods and 
their inhabitants, its youngest [B]lack and Hispanic residents answered back” 
with graffiti and in the process attempted to reclaim their neighborhood, their 
identity and their power); Ferrell, supra note 54, at 78–80 (noting that graffiti 
writers seek to document their existence in neighborhoods that have excluded 
them). 
 57. See, e.g., Ferrell, supra note 54, at 77 (discussing graffiti on the Berlin 
Wall as a form of resistance). 
 58. See id. at 79 (arguing that part of what urban graffiti artists seek to do 
is reclaim increasingly depersonalized public spaces); HERBERT I. SCHILLER, 
CULTURE, INC.: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF PUBLIC EXPRESSION 101–03 
(1989) (describing the emerging trend in American cities to fracture and isolate 
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also be ideological. Graffiti artists transform physical spaces into 
platforms of dissent and defiance.59 
The tradition of using graffiti as a mechanism of resistance 
is not new, nor is it confined to the United States. Graffiti artists 
in East Germany transformed the meaning of the Berlin Wall 
from a means of confinement to a record of resistance.60 In for-
mer Soviet countries, urban graffiti channeled and communi-
cated political resistance.61 In Great Britain, feminists used graf-
fiti to alter offensive billboards and to challenge the subjugation 
of women.62 In Northern Ireland, Catholic youth painted murals 
to promote resistance to British rule.63 Nicaraguan and Cana-
dian youth graffitied symbols of colonialism and repainted their 
cities with pro-revolutionary murals.64 In Palestine, where mili-
tants in occupied lands have limited access to traditional forums 
of communication, young graffiti artists paint street art to pro-
mote resistance.65 More recently, in Egypt, graffiti fueled and in-
formed the Arab spring uprisings in a variety of ways.66 Such 
 
communities and individuals through the construction of impersonal skyscrap-
ers with little accessible public space); Mike Davis, Fortress Los Angeles: The 
Militarization of Urban Space, in VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE 154, 154–80 (Michael Sorkin 
ed., 1992) (describing urban spatial sorting as designed to maximize use of real 
state at a cost to public space); see also Susan G. Davis, Streets Too Dead for 
Dreamin’, 255 NATION 220, 220–21 (1992) (noting the rise of “themed spaces” in 
contemporary cities); Michael Sorkin, Introduction to VARIATIONS ON A THEME 
PARK, supra, at xi–xv. 
 59. See Ferrell, supra note 54, at 79. 
 60. See TERRY TILLMAN, THE WRITINGS ON THE WALL: PEACE AT THE BER-
LIN WALL 17 (1990) (describing how art on the Berlin wall transformed it from 
an oppressive tool into a symbol of resistance and hope). 
 61. See generally JOHN BUSHNELL, MOSCOW GRAFFITI: LANGUAGE AND 
SUBCULTURE (1990) (describing the role of graffiti in undermining Soviet rule). 
 62. See, e.g., JILL POSENER, SPRAY IT LOUD 12–42 (1982) (providing exam-
ples of feminist use of graffiti to modify offensive billboards and to more broadly 
challenge the subjugation of women); see also Jessica Bennett, The #MeToo Mo-
ment: Art Inspired by the Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/us/reader-art-inspired-by-the-metoo-moment-sexual 
-harassment.html (describing the Guerilla Girls movement). 
 63. See BILL ROLSTON, POLITICS AND PAINTING: MURALS AND CONFLICT IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 73–111 (1991). 
 64. See Ferrell, supra note 54, at 77. 
 65. See Rich Wiles, Palestinian Graffiti: ‘Tagging’ Resistance, AL JAZEERA 
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/palestinian 
-graffiti-tagging-resistance-2013112015849368961.html. 
 66. See Waleed Rashad, Egypt’s Murals Are More Than Just Art, They Are 
a Form of Revolution, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 2013), https://www 
.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/egypts-murals-are-more-than-just-art-they 
-are-a-form-of-revolution-36377865. 
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graffiti documented events that were often suppressed in main-
stream media sources and served as tools of organization for the 
tech savvy and unsavvy alike, providing information on past and 
future events.67 
In the United States, graffiti shares an equally storied tra-
dition of supporting resistance. In 1970, students at UCLA took 
over the student union and graffitied their demand to “Free 
Bobby”—a reference to Black Panther leader Bobby Seale—in 
defiance of an indifferent, if not vindictive, police force.68 In New 
York City during the 1980s and 1990s, the Hip Hop movement 
utilized graffiti to mark a presence in defiance of policing policies 
implemented by urban revitalization mayors.69 More recently, 
the Black Lives Matter movement has used graffiti not only to 
draw attention to inherent racism but to mobilize change in com-
munities that may suppress speech or react with indifference or 
hostility in the face of unequal treatment and the in-custody 
deaths of Black men and women.70 In the early 1990s women 
scrawled the names of men who had harassed and assaulted 
them on bathroom stalls to share information and to name their 
assailants in the face of campus policies that seemed indifferent 
to sexual assault and harassment.71 Today, the #MeToo move-
ment has utilized graffiti to signal unity and safe spaces for 
women to speak of their experiences.72 The use of graffiti to pro-
mote a political cause is not isolated to the unknown artist. Well 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See SUSAN A. PHILLIPS, WALLBANGIN’: GRAFFITI AND GANGS IN L.A. 52 
(1999). 
 69. See RAHN, supra note 51, at 2 (discussing graffiti’s role in the Hip Hop 
movement); Ferrell, supra note 54, at 60–61. See generally POWERS, supra note 
51 (chronicling various stories and works of graffiti). 
 70. See Leah Freeman & Eric Bradner, Trump’s DC Hotel Vandalized with 
‘Black Lives Matter’ Graffiti, CNN (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/ 
02/politics/donald-trump-black-lives-matter-graffiti/index.html (describing use 
of graffiti to protest statements made by then candidate Trump regarding the 
Black community); Peter Holley, ‘Black Lives Matter’ Graffiti Appears on Con-
federate Memorials Across the U.S., WASH. POST (June 23, 2015), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/06/23/black-lives-matter 
-graffiti-appears-on-confederate-memorials-across-the-u-s (noting the use of 
graffiti to motivate protest of confederate memorials). 
 71. See JoAnne Jacobs, Rape and the Bathroom Wall, BALT. SUN (Dec. 19, 
1990), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1990-12-19/news/1990353005_1_ 
university-explicit-gutmann (describing the movement on college campuses to 
“name” rapists by writing their name on women’s bathroom walls as a means of 
warning other women and giving voice to an experience that was otherwise re-
pressed). 
 72. See Caitlin Dickerson & Stephanie Saul, Two Colleges Bound by History 
Are Roiled by the #MeToo Moment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www 
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known graffiti artists such as Banksy, Shepard Fairey, Molly 
Crabapple, and Basquiat (to name a few) recognize, and have 
recognized, the power of graffiti to push political change and to 
give voice to what otherwise would be suppressed.73 
Chicano Park in San Diego, now included on the National 
Register of Historical Places, began as an act of neighborhood 
reclamation when San Diego attempted to repurpose public 
space in the Latinx neighborhood of Barrio Logan.74 Fearing that 
a critical component of the community was literally being bull-
dozed away, members of the neighborhood created vibrant ren-
ditions of their cultural identity on highway support stan-
chions.75 Later, recognized Latinx artists constructed more 
permanent works on the same structures.76 The resulting park, 
in addition to its striking visual presentation, served other pur-
poses. It not only unified the community in an act of rebellion 
against more powerful state actors, but it marked and celebrated 
the identity and lives of those in the community.77 
The documentation of the history of the community mat-
tered because it spoke to the people who every day passed by and 
through the park. It also mattered because it claimed a real 
space—even if it was only a space under a highway—as the com-
munity’s own in defiance of larger, better financed interests that 
might seek to minimize or erase the very voice of the people who 
lived there.78 Chicano Park joins a graffitic tradition of memori-
alizing culture, race, politics, and lives that might not have ac-
cess to other mechanisms or forums for speech.79 
 
.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/us/colleges-sexual-harassment.html (describing #me-
too graffiti at Morehouse College, Spellman College, and Stanford University 
urging the institutions to end policies that condone and encourage the harass-
ment of women). 
 73. See Writings on the Wall: Urban Political Graffiti from Brexit to Trump 
– in Pictures, GUARDIAN (May 17, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ 
gallery/2017/may/17/writing-wall-political-graffiti-banksy-brexit-trump-in 
-pictures (providing examples of this political expression through graffiti). 
 74. See Phillip Brookman, El Centro Cultural de la Raza, Fifteen Years, in 
MADE IN AZTLAN 12, 19–21, 38–43 (Phillip Brookman & Guillermo Gomez-Pena 
eds., 1986) (describing the history of Chicano Park and the Barrio Logan). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. This significance was perhaps best expressed in oral histories of the 
park documented by the Chicano Park Museum. See CHICANO PARK MUSEUM, 
http://www.chicanoparkmuseum.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). 
 78. See PHILLIPS, supra note 68, at 1–49 (describing the anthropological 
value of graffiti in Los Angeles as a means of documenting youth identity). 
 79. Id. (discussing the use of memorial graffiti in Los Angeles to document 
not only gang violence, but to call for social reform). See generally G. JAMES 
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In all of this, graffiti recognizes that there is a power to be-
ing seen that carries with it a power to be heard. From rape vic-
tims to those who would challenge colonialism or police brutality 
to those who resist occupation, graffiti is a medium like no other. 
In larger conversations about race and socioeconomic political 
movements, graffiti not only records a marginal voice, it grants 
it a power that is directly linked to its physical, visual existence. 
For marginalized communities and speakers, graffiti is more 
than the sum of its parts. It exceeds artistic expression (whether 
a tag or an elaborate mural) and opens up the possibility for un-
derrepresented individuals to claim their identity and to resist 
cultural and social norms that would silence their voice.80 Illicit 
speech such as graffiti lays claim to a power and purpose that 
cannot be realized in other, more bounded speech forums—the 
message itself is embedded in the medium of the speech.81 Cer-
tain words carry a meaning all their own that no synonym can 
replace.82 So too does graffiti shoulder a meaning and message 
that other means fail. To defend graffiti is therefore to defend 
the value of that message. 
This is not to say that graffiti either always serves a vaunted 
role or that it always accurately represents the identity of the 
 
DAICHENDT, STAY UP! LOS ANGELES STREET ART (2012) (chronicling the role of 
street art, including graffiti to push marginalized political positions). 
 80. See DAICHENDT, supra note 79, at 69–70; PHILLIPS, supra note 68, at 
13–61 (describing the communicative power of graffiti); ROSE, supra note 51, at 
42 (noting that even simple tagging of subway trains in NYC in the 1970s cre-
ated a mechanism by which splintered communities, particularly those of Black 
and Latino boys and men, could communicate and show unity). 
 81. Questions of the value of medium certainly arise in the context of other 
illicit and non-illicit forms of speech. The early Hip Hop movement, for example, 
served a similar resistive purpose in New York City in particular. See ROSE, 
supra note 51, at 34–36. See generally PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP 
HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009) (describing the role of Hip Hop in pushing back 
on dominant race-based policing models). Even protected speech categories have 
struggled to reclaim power in the face of permissive restrictions particularly in 
the context of forums. See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PE-
TITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PE-
TITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 3 (2012) (describing 
curtailment of political dissent to designated protest zones at the Democratic 
and Republican Conventions). 
 82. See RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLE-
SOME WORD 39–55 (2002) (noting that even this most offensive word has under-
gone a “reclamation” of sorts as a means of expressing particular identity and 
rebellion); see also Jessica Valenti, SlutWalks and the Future of Feminism, 
WASH. POST (June 3, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
slutwalks-and-the-future-of-feminism/2011/06/01/AGjB9LIH_story.html (de-
scribing the adoption of derogatory words such as “slut” as a mechanism of em-
powerment and reclaiming identity). 
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community in which it appears. Works by noted scholars such as 
Randall Kennedy83 and James Forman, Jr.84 highlight the con-
tested nature of the claim that graffiti benefits marginalized 
populations. In their critique of the relationship between crime 
enforcement and the Black community, both Kennedy and For-
man note that policing, even of minor offenses, in minority 
neighborhoods carries an undeniably protective component.85 To 
paraphrase Kennedy, the presence of graffiti not only signals 
blight but it transforms simple acts of existence in the neighbor-
hood into acts of peril.86 In this, the graffiti on the walls, homes, 
and stores of these communities do not serve as positive acts of 
reclaiming space, voice, and identity; they serve as a warning.87 
As will be discussed further in Section IV, I do not doubt the 
accuracy of this critique, nor do I doubt, as both Kennedy and 
Forman seem to acknowledge, that in urban spaces graffiti exists 
both as an act of lawlessness and as an act of reclamation. Graf-
fiti may both appear as a threat or warning to some and appear 
as a mark of identity and community to others. The creation of 
an affirmative defense of speech to graffiti is a recognition of the 
duality of illicit speech—a duality neglected under current poli-
cies that criminalize graffiti. 
II.  CRIMINALIZING GRAFFITI   
Despite the role that graffiti plays in promoting dissenting 
and marginalized speech, First Amendment scholars tend to ig-
nore or minimize its communicative components. They are not 
alone in this perception. Criminal law regulates graffiti based on 
the harm it causes property interests.88 As a result, graffiti is not 
afforded a free speech defense because it is not treated as a 
“speech” based crime.89 
 
 83. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) 
(exploring in depth the relationship between minority communities and current 
enforcement of criminal law). 
 84. See generally JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017) (noting the role Black communities play 
in supporting tougher policing). 
 85. See id. at 11; KENNEDY, supra note 83, at 3 (noting the focus of “law and 
order” rhetoric on limiting the misery caused by crime). 
 86. See KENNEDY, supra note 83, at 136–67, 351. 
 87. See id. at 351. 
 88. See L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 49.84.1(A) (2000) (rationalizing graffiti 
regulation based on detriments to property value). 
 89. Cf. Mettler, supra note 20, at 251 (arguing for the extension of a free 
speech defense for private property owners who wish to preserve uncommis-
sioned graffiti on their own property). 
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Graffiti’s effect on property is real and tangible. The esti-
mated cost for removing or obscuring graffiti on federally-con-
trolled property falls between $5 and $15 billion dollars annu-
ally.90 Nationally, municipal and county governments estimate 
the cost to eradicate graffiti in their jurisdictions to be in the 
millions of dollars.91 In the 2017–2018 budget, Mayor Eric Gar-
ceti promised a $2 million dollar increase to the graffiti removal 
budget for Los Angeles.92 The same budget failed to provide spe-
cific budget numbers for the removal program, but past esti-
mates placed the cost of graffiti removal in Los Angeles at $7 
million per year.93 In its 2018 Budget Overview, Chicago Mayor 
Rahm Emanuel highlighted “enhanced graffiti removal” as one 
of his 2018 initiatives.94 The budget for the initiative was a pre-
cise $4,719,423.95 Graffiti, however, is not simply a large urban 
or coastal problem. Tucson, Arizona, for example, places the es-
timated cost of graffiti removal at $1.6 million.96 In addition to 
 
 90. Jim Walsh & Dennis Wagner, Wiping Out Graffiti? Here’s an App for 
That, USA TODAY (Mar. 2, 2010), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/ 
2010-03-01-graffiti-tech_N.htm (placing the federal cost of graffiti abatement 
between $15–18 billion annually). Precise budget figures for graffiti abatement 
by the federal government are challenging to locate in part because multiple 
agencies include it in their budget. The Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Department of the Interior, and the General Services Administration include 
maintenance of public property in their budgets. See generally DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, FISCAL YEAR 2019: THE INTERIOR BUDGET IN BRIEF (2018), https:// 
www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/2019_highlights_book.pdf; ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, FY 2019 EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF (2018), https://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/2018-02/documents/fy-2019-epa-bib.pdf; U.S. GEN. SERVS. 
ADMIN., FY 2019 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION (2018), https://www.gsa.gov/ 
cdnstatic/GSA%20FY%202019%20CJ.pdf. The Department of Justice puts the 
total federal cost of graffiti abatement at $12 billion per year. See DEBORAH LAM 
WEISEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GRAFFITI 2 (2002), http://www.popcenter.org/ 
problems/pdfs/graffiti.pdf. 
 91. Municipal estimates for graffiti clean-up vary, but major municipalities 
report graffiti clean-up in the millions, with an aggregate total in the billions. 
See, e.g., Sonia Krishnan, Graffiti Vandals Cost Public Millions, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Apr. 26, 2010), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/graffiti-vandals 
-cost-public-millions. 
 92. See CITY OF L.A., 2017–18 BUDGET SUMMARY 12 (2017), http://cao 
.lacity.org/budget17-18/2017-18Budget_Summary.pdf. 
 93. See Aaron Mendelson, LA. Scrubs Away 30 Million Square Feet of Graf-
fiti Each Year, S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.scpr.org/news/ 
2015/09/10/54285/la-scrubs-away-30-million-square-feet-of-graffiti. 
 94. See CITY OF CHI., 2018 BUDGET OVERVIEW 88 (2018), https://www 
.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp_info/2018Budget/2018_ 
Budget_Overview.pdf. In light of past initiatives, Emanuel boasted a eighteen 
percent drop in graffiti. Id. 
 95. Id. at 91. 
 96. See Bud Foster, New Program Aims to Ease Graffiti Clean-up Costs, 
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the cost of removing the graffiti, the surface upon which the graf-
fiti is placed may be damaged either through the application of 
the tag or through its removal.97 
The aggregate cost of repair to private property is harder to 
determine. Private citizens are not obligated to report the cost of 
removing graffiti from their property, although some jurisdic-
tions charge homeowners a fine for displaying graffiti on their 
property in addition to charging a cost for city-sponsored re-
moval.98 Even without data, there is little question that graffiti 
is, as an illicitly placed image, an affront to the owner’s ability 
to control access and content on his property. 
In addition, graffiti arguably causes a harm that cannot be 
calibrated in terms of the cost of removal or property repair. 
Graffiti can carry a psychological effect on the value of the prop-
erty.99 The presence of graffiti not only may offend the owner’s 
sense of aesthetic or ownership, but it may fundamentally 
change how the owner views his property in the first place. 
Furthermore, graffiti is often viewed as a sign of greater 
harm to come, or of danger already in our midst. New York City 
Mayor Rudy Giuliani warned that graffiti is used primarily by 
gangs100 (as will be discussed in a moment, this turns out to be a 
 
TUCSON NEWS NOW (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.tucsonnewsnow.com/story/ 
31285484/new-program-aims-to-ease-graffiti-clean-up-costs. 
 97. See WEISEL, supra note 90, at 1 (noting the high costs to repair surfaces 
damaged by graffiti); see also Marc Ferris, Graffiti as Art. As a Gang Tag. As a 
Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/nyregion/ 
graffiti-as-art-as-a-gang-tag-as-a-mess.html (describing Westchester County’s 
growing graffiti abatement costs resulting not only from the cost of removal but 
from the cost of restoration of the surface upon which the graffiti appeared). 
 98. See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 49.84.3(B) (2015) (restricting graffiti, 
murals, and other public displays); SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE, §§ 54.405(b)–
54.407 (2015); MIAMI, FLA., ORDINANCES PART II, §§ 37-2(f )–(g) (2007); AT-
LANTA, GA., ORDINANCES PART II, § 74-174 (2011); BOS., MASS., MUN. CODE, 
§ 16-8.5 (2005); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 10-117, 10-117.3 (2015) (crimi-
nalizing the act of creating graffiti, possession of graffiti paraphernalia includ-
ing broad tipped markers and foam brushes by minors and the display of graffiti 
images by property owners).  
 99. Under graffiti abatement ordinances, a municipality may require a 
homeowner to remove graffiti from his own property even if the homeowner 
commissioned the work and/or would like to continue to display the work. See 
Steve Hartman, Mural Inspired by Starry Night Becomes a First Amendment 
Issue, CBS NEWS (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mural 
-inspired-by-starry-night-becomes-a-first-amendment-issue (describing a city’s 
threat to fine a family up to $250 per day after the homeowners commissioned 
a starry night mural for their autistic son); see also supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text. 
 100. See Jonathan P. Hicks, Mayor Announces New Assault on Graffiti, Cit-
ing Its Toll on City, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/ 
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contested proposition101). His successor, Michael Bloomberg, 
warned that graffiti “is an invitation to criminals and a message 
to citizens that we don’t care.”102 Despite evidence that relatively 
small amounts of graffiti are “gang” related103—and despite the 
benefits of graffiti to some perspectives and some communities—
the fear of what graffiti signals persists. That this mythology 
around graffiti seems to fall somewhere toward the Boogeyman 
end of the spectrum of real threats has not blunted efforts to con-
trol it. Such a characterization of graffiti allows graffiti regula-
tion to become a means to control behavior and to justify arrest 
among particular marginalized populations.104 Graffiti is used as 
the sign to scare a neighborhood—or those viewing the neighbor-
hood—into believing that the community is unsafe and that its 
youth must be arrested; its outsider voices must remain sub-
merged.105 
The rise in graffiti prosecution and the stand-alone crimi-
nalization of graffiti can be linked to the emergence of broken 
windows policing in the early 1990s.106 As a theory, broken win-
dows policing is based on the premise that people are more will-
ing and likely to commit crimes in neighborhoods that appear 
unwatched and uncared for by residents and local authorities.107 
 
11/17/nyregion/mayor-announces-new-assault-on-graffiti-citing-its-toll-on-city 
.html. 
 101. See Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 739, 743 (1990) (noting that graffiti attributed to gang 
members in Los Angeles frequently was not in fact gang-related). 
 102. See Jeff Chang, American Graffiti, VILLAGE VOICE (Sept. 10, 2002), 
http://www.villagevoice.com/arts/american-graffiti-7142061. 
 103. See Burrell, supra note 101. 
 104. This critique of deterrent policing is not limited to graffiti. Opponents 
contend that arrests and stops based on suspicion of low-level offenses tend to 
have a disproportionate impact on minority male populations. See Floyd v. City 
of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding that 
NYPD’s stop and frisk policies were unconstitutional in part because the policy 
promoted race-based stops and targeted Black and Latino populations dispro-
portionally). For a broader critique of policing policies, crime and race, see gen-
erally Delgado, supra note 45. 
 105. See, e.g., CITY OF N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, COMBATING GRAFFITI: RECLAIM-
ING PUBLIC SPACES IN NEW YORK 4 (2004), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/ 
downloads/pdf/anti_graffiti/Combating_Graffiti.pdf (warning that graffiti may 
be associated with hate groups, gangs or, “the occult” and therefore must be 
removed to protect citizens). 
 106. See Daniel Brook, The Cracks in “Broken Windows,” BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 
19, 2006), http://archive.boston.com/new.globe.ideas/articles.2006/02/19/the_ 
cracks_in_broken_windows (describing the emergence of broken windows polic-
ing and criticisms of the practice). 
 107. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATL. MONTHLY 
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Adherents to this theory reason that broken windows are a 
“gateway” offense to greater crime.108 When communities are 
concerned about murder and other violent crime, a minor prop-
erty offense such as a broken window seems almost laughably 
insignificant; its harm a welcome alternative to a notification of 
a murder or rape. But the broken windows theory is premised on 
the notion that any neighborhood at any moment could slide 
from broken windows to murder.109 If a neighborhood doesn’t 
bother to prevent or repair broken windows, would it bother to 
prevent or even be capable of preventing more serious crime? In 
order to decrease crime, therefore, a neighborhood should “re-
place or fix the broken windows,”110 and so present an appear-
ance of watchfulness and lawfulness. 
But broken windows policing was not just a call for commu-
nity activism; it was a call for proactive law enforcement that 
prioritized order as a means of preventing crime. Proponents ar-
gued that it was far better—and that it was a police officer’s 
job—to “keep order in a community” rather than to just respond 
to serious crime after the fact.111 The theory was not without its 
results112 and controversies.113 Boston and New York both re-
ported dramatic drops in crime after implementing broken win-
dows policing.114 Soon, other cities adopted the theory and the 
zero-tolerance policies that accompanied it.115 
 
(Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken 
-windows/304465. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., MANHATTAN INST., 
DO POLICE MATTER?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE 
REFORMS 9–10, 18 (2001) (claiming that broken windows policing had a statis-
tically significant role in the decrease in New York City’s crime rates). 
 113. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE 
OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 6 (2001) (arguing that broken windows policing 
did little to reduce crime rates in the cities in which it was implemented and 
subjected minority populations to the worst of both worlds—increased arrests 
and convictions on minor offenses and longer prison sentences based on prior 
records and retributive sentencing schemes); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Lud-
wig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social 
Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006) (summarizing other studies on broken 
windows policing and calling into question Kelling and Sousa’s claims).  
 114. See KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 112, at 18; Harcourt & Ludwig, supra 
note 113, at 274. 
 115. See Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 113, at 272. 
  
1308 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1285 
 
Broken windows policing targeted graffiti on the theory that 
the proliferation of graffiti not only damages the physical struc-
ture upon which it is placed, but damages the community in 
which it appears.116 Seen through this lens, even the most benign 
of graffiti images may inch a neighborhood towards descent. The 
presence of the spray-painted image suggests lawlessness or in-
difference. Initials carved or written with a sharpie marker on 
windows and porches advertise neglect and blight. Even a mural, 
with its hours of construction and intricacy of design, may signal 
a lack of police presence that might have otherwise interrupted 
the project. If graffiti can spread with apparent wanton abandon, 
what does that say about the police presence in the neighborhood 
or law enforcement in the community? The theory of broken win-
dows or gateway crime policing, after all, rests on the premise 
that to allow minor crime to go unchecked will communicate that 
greater crimes may enjoy similar immunity. 
There are reasons to question the broken windows theory of 
deterrence, as will be discussed in a moment,117 but the underly-
ing claim that minor crimes, even if they lead to no greater of-
fense, may undermine confidence in a neighborhood makes some 
sense.118 Likewise, a police presence signals an interest in the 
community and may deter crimes and criminals.119 Outside the 
context of policing theory, the presence of graffiti may signal a 
lack of interest by property owners in maintaining their undis-
turbed private property.120 Under either a theory of societal de-
valuation or property devaluation, graffiti is unique in that it 
occupies a physical space and so serves as a constant and visual 
reminder of the crime that occurred—one that may well linger 
even after the offending tag is removed.121 
Further still, graffiti carries with it a sense of violation. It is 
a mark on spaces normally held apart. The home, the business, 
 
 116. See WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: HOW 
AMERICA’S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC, at ix (1998) (noting dam-
age to the New York City community caused by crime). 
 117. See infra notes 129–41 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 120. See FERRELL, supra note 20, at 178–81 (describing graffiti as an affront 
to the property owner’s aesthetic and a rejection of the property owner’s unfet-
tered control of the property). 
 121. In this, it is no accident that mayors in Los Angeles and Chicago created 
specific budget line items for graffiti removal in conjunction with their urban 
revitalization efforts. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
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the monument, the side of the road—whether collectively or in-
dividually owned—are spaces that are subject to control. They 
mirror the most conservative of the collective social sense, re-
flecting either public property’s calming influences of collective 
decision-making or private property’s practical and conforming 
aesthetic. Although communities may confront other shocking 
pieces of public art—Edwin Meese’s bare-breasted lady jus-
tice,122 the neighbor with the purple house and garish lawn or-
naments, the business with the bright orange storefront and 
leering owl123—such deviations are regularized in some way. 
They are subject to laws, regulations, and communally agreed-
upon ordinances that dictate not only their content, but often the 
method used to display that content.124 Despite the broad vari-
ance among communities regarding this regulation, graffiti 
seems to fall outside the scope of them all.125 It is an unantici-
pated and unbidden display by the property owner—whether 
public or private—and, unlike other restrictions on property, 
carries a criminal status. 
Setting aside for a moment the regulation of graffiti on pub-
lic spaces, the regulation of graffiti on private property, particu-
larly dwellings, is consistent with long-held principles of crimi-
nal law. In criminal law, the home is recognized as a sphere in 
which individuals may enjoy not only an expectation of privacy 
that is not found in other spheres,126 but also a right to protect 
that space that is not found in other locations.127 In this context, 
graffiti on a dwelling not only signals the possibility of other 
crime, but it also defies the very notion that the home is a sacred 
 
 122. See Dan Eggen, Sculpted Bodies and a Strip Act at Justice Dept., WASH. 
POST (June 25, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2005/06/24/AR2005062401797.html (discussing the infamous appearance of the 
bare breasted sculpture of Lady Justice behind Attorney General Edwin Meese 
III as he discussed a report on pornography). 
 123. See generally HOOTERS, https://www.hooters.com (last visited Oct. 29, 
2018) (website for a business with notable storefront design). 
 124. See generally David Burnett, Note, Judging the Aesthetics of Billboards, 
23 J.L. & POL. 171 (2007) (describing the history of sign regulations). 
 125. See FERRELL, supra note 20, at 190 (comparing graffiti to anarchist 
movements in its rejection of all authority). 
 126. See JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 1–8 (2009) (describing the evolution of 
the law’s relationship with the home including heightened expectations of pri-
vacy in the context of the Fourth Amendment and the up to very recent (and 
arguably current) reluctance of law enforcement to make arrests in domestic 
violence cases). 
 127. Id. at 55–86 (discussing the importance of the home in the construction 
of self-defense doctrine). 
  
1310 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1285 
 
or special space. Some jurisdictions have recognized this distinc-
tion, carving out either distinct sentencing regimes or distinct 
crimes for graffiti placed on private dwellings or privately occu-
pied buildings.128 
All this is to say what many proponents of broken windows 
or deterrent policing have long suspected: graffiti is bad. It dam-
ages property and people in tangible and intangible ways. Crim-
inalizing it, regardless of its content or aesthetic appeal, makes 
sense. But the true legacy of this policy is complex. Despite the 
popularity of broken windows policing and its purported crime 
reduction, critics question its results.129 Did it actually reduce 
crime rates, or did it just create an atmosphere in which police 
could justify over intrusion into citizen’s lives?130 Did it improve 
the community’s sense of security, or did it just support the in-
creasing militarization of the police?131 Did it target minority-
populated neighborhoods in an effort to keep them safe, or in an 
effort to cox their citizenry into submission?132 In the context of 
New York City, where this debate has been especially conten-
tious and litigious,133 the zero-tolerance policies of the New York 
Police Department in the 1990s and early 2000s facilitated a re-
vitalization of the city and the gentrification of neighborhoods; 
but like all changes, there were trade-offs.134 
Plaintiffs challenging New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy 
contended that broken windows policing promoted a carte 
blanche authority for officers to target young men of color for 
brief detentions often based on the thinnest of suspicions.135 Eric 
 
 128. See Mettler, supra note 20, at 258. 
 129. See HARCOURT, supra note 113, at 6; Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 
113. 
 130. See Sarah Childress, The Problem with “Broken Windows” Policing, 
PBS FRONTLINE (June 28, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/ 
the-problem-with-broken-windows-policing. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. In Floyd v. City of New York, Black male plaintiffs challenged the New 
York City Police Department’s policy of Terry stops known as “stop and frisk.” 
See Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle 
Suits on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html. 
 134. See ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK MURDER MYSTERY: THE TRUE STORY 
BEHIND THE CRIME CRASH OF THE 1990S 92–98 (2000) (arguing that stop and 
frisk and other aggressive police tactics that targeted minority populations were 
products of broken window policing policies). 
 135. See Complaint at 2, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08-01034). 
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Garner’s encounter with Staten Island police officers in 2014 of-
fers another glimpse at proactive policing. Garner was stopped 
and eventually arrested after officers allegedly observed him 
selling loose cigarettes.136 In cellphone video of the incident, Gar-
ner can be heard protesting the frequency of police encounters 
for such trivial offenses.137 As the encounter escalates, Garner 
protests first that he wants to be left alone and second that he 
can’t breathe.138 In the end, Eric Garner dies as a result of a po-
lice administered chokehold in response to an offense punishable 
by a ticket.139 Garner is hardly alone in his experience of police 
investigation for minor offenses based on an apparent belief that 
even minor crimes lead to major danger for communities. 
Certainly, it may be argued that stop and frisk and other 
aggressive police tactics always existed. Broken windows polic-
ing just gave name and policy goals to the practice, and cellphone 
video capability just offered documentation to a reality that long 
existed.140 Whatever the true legacy of the policy, to think of 
graffiti as speech complicates the discussion. It suggests that the 
behavior to be regulated may actually carry some value. This 
renders graffiti constitutionally distinct from a broken window 
or a street-corner crack purveyor. Graffiti carries a message be-
yond an invitation to crime. Critics of broken windows policing, 
in fact, have noted that graffiti can unite rather than separate a 
community.141 
From this perspective, graffiti is seen not as a sign of blight 
or neglect, but as a mechanism of expressing marginalized per-
spectives. In the United States, where large swaths of the popu-
lation lack the economic power to own property, where urban 
communities are rapidly gentrifying, and where visible spaces 
 
 136. Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric 
-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 392–97 
(2016) (discussing methods and benefits of citizens monitoring police). 
 141. See Michelle Bougdanos, The Visual Artists Rights Act and Its Applica-
tion to Graffiti Murals: Whose Wall Is It Anyway?, 18 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 
549, 549 (2002) (describing one graffiti artist’s approach to creating murals that 
benefit the community). The City of Portland recognized this proposition in its 
anti-graffiti ordinance, noting that some types of graffiti (murals) can “increase 
community identity and foster a sense of place.” PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE & 
CHARTER tit. 4, ch. 4.10.010 (2009), http://www.portlandoregon.gov/citycode/ 
article/257806. 
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are commercialized, the possibility of expressing dissent through 
a legally permissible physical display is curtailed. While the 
President may be able to place his name on some of the world’s 
most desirable property, the lowly tagger or muralist, even if 
equally (or more) politically aware, cannot. The difference is not 
the value of the message, but the net worth of the speaker. Don-
ald Trump owns the property and so, within certain limitations, 
can label it as he pleases; the tagger, with no property, cannot. 
In this, whether a gang tag or a Shepard Fairey mural,142 
graffiti celebrates and identifies the component parts of the com-
munity that might otherwise be lost or silenced under broken 
windows’ goal of clean streets, orderly citizens, and an economic 
and legal system that links expression to property rights. Graf-
fiti is a voice that will not be broken or corralled or owned. It is 
conduct that claims space and, in the process, defies ownership 
and any other cultural norm that might silence it. For some dis-
enfranchised or marginalized communities graffiti may be a 
unique avenue of communication. 
Some might argue that to accept that graffiti is speech begs 
the question of whether it is the type of speech that the law can 
and should recognize and protect. Put another way, even if graf-
fiti communicates a message, does it carry a constitutional 
value? Certainly some, if not all, graffiti carries a communicative 
value.143 Even if the message is mundane or poorly constructed, 
First Amendment theory would suggest that it carries some 
value that at times may rise to a level warranting protection.144 
At a minimum, as will be discussed in Part III, the marketplace 
of ideas theory of speech would suggest that the value of the 
 
 142. Shepard Fairey, a Chicago-based graffiti artist, is credited with creat-
ing the now-ubiquitous “Giant Obey” stencil mural, as well as creating works 
for Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign and Bernie Sanders’ 2016 campaign. See 
SHEPARD FAIREY, COVERT TO OVERT (2015) (collecting Fairey’s works). More re-
cently, Fairey created a “We the People” series of posters featuring a Black, La-
tina, or an American-flag-hijab-clad Muslim woman that have become main-
stays at anti-Trump and women’s marches. For examples of these and other 
recent works, see We the People Art, OBEYGIANT.COM (Jan. 16, 2017), https:// 
obeygiant.com/people-art-avail-download-free. 
 143. For a rather endearing account of this value, see Kie Relyea, Iconic Rock 
South of Bellingham Tells Layers of Community Stories, BELLINGHAM HERALD 
(July 10, 2018), https://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/article21459248 
5.html. For a more monetized account of this value, see Robin Pogrebin & Scott 
Reyburn, A Basquiat Sells for “Mind-Blowing” $110.5 Million at Auction, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/arts/jean-michel 
-basquiat-painting-is-sold-for-110-million-at-auction.html. 
 144. See infra Part III. 
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speech is irrelevant (or only marginally relevant) to the decision 
to regulate. 
Current regulation of graffiti, however, is indifferent to its 
status as speech.145 That graffiti may serve to communicate oth-
erwise suppressed messages—or, in many jurisdictions, even 
that the property owner may want to retain the graffiti—is irrel-
evant for criminal law’s purposes.146 The defense of speech is pre-
cluded in the assessment of criminal liability.147 
Not only is this rejection of a speech defense inconsistent 
with the treatment of speech in the context of torts (which offers 
a variety of defenses based on speech rights),148 but it creates an 
odd and absolute hierarchy of values—prioritizing property 
rights absolutely over speech rights. This is further complicated 
by the fact that criminal law relies on the State to enforce such 
a hierarchy of values. In short, in the case of graffiti regulation, 
the State becomes the guardian of property rights at the expense 
of speech rights. 
Admittedly, this heroic view of graffiti is not without its dif-
ficulties. For every tagger reclaiming some space in his neigh-
borhood as his own or some political movement rising from a 
spray-paint can, there is a grandmother scrubbing the tag off her 
garage door to avoid a city fine under an abatement statute or 
some frustrated business owner who is whitewashing his store’s 
walls. But this vision of graffiti as a voice for a neighborhood—
as speech itself—turns the underlying premise of broken win-
dows policing on its head. This reorientation of the policing the-
ory suggests the need for a new theory of criminal law that takes 
into account the speech value of graffiti. First, allowing speech 
as a defense to graffiti charges categorically rejects the notion 
that a state actor through criminal enforcement is more capable 
of protecting a community’s identity than the members of that 
community itself. Second, a free speech defense to graffiti sup-
ports the notion that communities themselves should have some 
say in weighing the value of the speech that is graffiti in contrast 
to the property rights this speech undermines. Third, the possi-
bility of a speech defense to graffiti argues that the above de-
scribed weighing of values should—in at least some cases—be an 
explicit part of a trial (or even charging and plea) conversation, 
and should not be relegated to the politically expedient 
 
 145. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra note 99. 
 147. See supra notes 34, 41–42, 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 148. See infra notes 186–92 and accompanying text. 
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backrooms of police or prosecutorial discretion. This inevitably 
begs the question of where graffiti fits in the larger free speech 
cannon? Part III explores the implications of inserting graffiti 
into a larger First Amendment construct. 
III.  FREE SPEECH AND GRAFFITI   
The history of the First Amendment and free speech juris-
prudence is complex.149 It twists and turns around prevailing ju-
dicial thought and is rewritten as notions of liberty and democ-
racy itself shift. Yet, in its various iterations, two related free 
speech ideals emerge: the notion of free speech rights as a means 
to promote equality, and the notion of free speech rights as pro-
moting political liberty.150 Both profess an allegiance to the First 
Amendment’s negative construction of speech rights—as less of 
a right to speak and more of a promise of non-interference with 
speech. And both, as of late, pivot increasingly around property 
in two distinct ways. First, both seek to develop a workable doc-
trine surrounding the inevitable conflict between other rights 
and concerns, including property interests (both public and pri-
vate) and speech interests. Second, particularly as of late, the 
notion of speech itself is increasingly linked to property—prop-
erty not only as a means to facilitate speech,151 but property as 
speech.152 
Within this larger, value-driven framework, free speech reg-
ulation is divided between regulation of content and regulation 
of something other than content that nonetheless impacts 
speech.153 Admittedly, it is hard to fit graffiti neatly into permis-
sive speech categories derived from either of these regulatory 
 
 149. See generally David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amend-
ment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205 (1983) (providing a comprehensive his-
tory of the evolution of speech doctrine). 
 150. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 143, 144–45 (2010) (positing that it is helpful to think of the Cit-
izens United decision in terms of overarching speech doctrine). 
 151. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(overturning FEC regulation of corporate financing of political speech). 
 152. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18–22, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-
111) (arguing that a cake was in fact speech). Ultimately, the Court did not 
reach the free speech question raised by the petitioner. See Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24. However, Justice Thomas wrote separately 
and signaled a willingness to recognize the cake in question as speech. See id. 
at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 153. Such content-neutral regulations are colloquially known as “time, place 
or manner” restrictions. For examples of the Court upholding such restrictions, 
  
2019] GRAFFITI, SPEECH, & CRIME 1315 
 
techniques. Some graffiti would appear to fall into low value 
speech categories and suffer regulation as such. All graffiti 
would seem subject to time, place, or manner restrictions, which 
would constitutionally permit regulation without consideration 
of the content of the speech itself. 
In discussing free speech doctrine, however, lines are rarely 
clear, and boundaries of speech regulation and permission may 
sway. For example, speech that in one era may appear to be 
properly regulated as threatening will later be exalted as dis-
senting speech critical to the democratic process as community 
norms of political dissent and activism shift.154 The pornography 
of one era is the accepted artistic expression of another.155 The 
same can be said for time, place, or manner restrictions. As 
neighborhoods and the nature of property itself shift, so does the 
regulation of the speech that must be allowed to occur on the 
property. Acknowledging these shifting values and norms, this 
Part discusses free speech doctrine as it stands today. Part IV 
turns to the argument that given the value of graffiti, and given 
the unavailability of alternative forums for the type of expres-
sion graffiti engages in, criminal law ought to recognize a free 
speech defense to graffiti. 
 
see Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 
147 (1939). For a more general discussion of time, place, or manner restrictions, 
see JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND 
FREE PRESS §§ 3:6–3:11 (1979). 
 154. See Rabban, supra note 149, at 1345–51 (discussing the evolution of the 
“clear and present danger” analysis). 
 155. For example, under the Comstock Act of 1873, any discussion of sexual 
intercourse, including that connected with sex education, was classified as por-
nography. See Gloria Feldt, Margaret Sanger’s Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/opinion/nyregionopinions/ 
15CIfeldt.html (describing Margaret Sanger’s struggle against the Comstock 
Act’s application to sex education). Similarly, an early Thomas Edison film fea-
turing a woman dancing was considered shocking when released because the 
woman revealed underskirts as she danced. Id. Today sex education is widely 
accepted as part of public education. See What’s the State of Sex Education in 
the U.S.?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/ 
for-educators/whats-state-sex-education-us (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). Also, In-
stagram stars routinely post nude and semi-nude photos of themselves and oth-
ers. See Cardi B. (@iamcardib), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/ 
BlHLWiBHZOP/?hl=en&taken-by=iamcardib (last visited Oct. 6, 2018); Scott 
Disick (@letthelordbewithyou), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/ 
8lOUR1u3-0/?utm_source=ig_embed (last visited Oct. 29, 2018); Kim Kar-
dashian (@kimkardashian), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/ 
BjF0AnaF_7y/?hl=en&taken-by=kimkardashian (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). All 
of this suggests, as the Court intended, evolving community standards of the 
obscene or pornographic. 
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A. REGULATING THE CONTENT OF SPEECH 
Despite free speech’s front and center position in the First 
Amendment (and the accompanying rhetoric of free speech dur-
ing the American Revolution),156 the regulation of speech in the 
face of competing values was almost immediate. As early as 
1798, the Alien and Sedition Acts permitted suppression of anti-
government speech in the name of national security.157 The reg-
ulation of speech has often struck an uneasy balance between 
the speech itself and interests implicated either by the content 
of the speech or by the impact that the speech may have on other 
rights and interests—specifically those related to property and 
national security.158  
Thus, speech can be permissibly regulated despite the First 
Amendment when it falls into an “unprotected” category of 
speech or, as will be discussed momentarily, when it infringes 
upon a private property owner’s rights or oversteps the permis-
sible bounds of public spaces.159 In the former category, the con-
tent of the speech itself drives the regulation. Obscene, truly 
threatening or libelous speech is of little or no interest to the 
First Amendment and may be constitutionally proscribed based 
on its content.160 The evaluation of what speech “qualifies” as 
 
 156. In Whitney v. California, for example, the Court proclaimed that 
“[t]hose who won our independence believed . . . that public discussion is a po-
litical duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American 
government.” 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). 
 157. See JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION 
ACTS 24, 41 (1951) (discussing “a dangerous French faction was at work”); LEON-
ARD WILLIAMS LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 30 (1985) (describing pros-
ecutions for anti-government speech); Frederick S. Allis, Jr., Boston and the Al-
ien and Sedition Laws, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOSTONIAN SOCIETY 39–51 
(1951) (describing one of my favorite Alien and Sedition Act prosecutions of Da-
vid Brown in 1800 for carving “[m]ay moral virtue be the basis of civil govern-
ment” into a “liberty” pole in Boston). 
 158. For other examples of such a balance, see CLEMENT EATON, THE FREE-
DOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH (1964) (describing southern 
states’ restrictions on abolitionist speech both before and after the Civil War). 
See also Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Devil Comes to Kansas: A Story of Free Love, 
Sexual Privacy, and the Law, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 71 (2012) (describing the 
regulation of pro-union and free love speech as evidenced in the Moses Harmon 
trial). 
 159. See infra note 160. 
 160. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (listing 
unprotected categories of speech). Chaplinsky drew its list in no small part from 
Justice Holmes’s famous declaration in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 
52 (1919), that “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect 
a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” For a further 
description of categories of “unprotected” speech, see generally Rabban, supra 
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low-value speech is more complicated. Modern free speech doc-
trine leaves this determination to the community that must suf-
fer the speech. 
For example, obscenity has always been permissibly regu-
lated under the First Amendment.161 Despite this, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has struggled to define obscenity.162 In constructing 
a standard for classifying speech as obscene, the Court turned to 
community norms to judge what speech has redeeming value 
and so merits protection.163 Starting in the 1950s, the Court 
chose to define obscenity not in terms of its “immorality,” but in 
 
note 149 (discussing instances of protected and unprotected speech). Even the 
notion of some speech as “unprotected” has received pushback from more mod-
ern Courts. For example, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court stated: 
We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are “not 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech,” Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 
266 (1952); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72; or that the “protection of 
the First Amendment does not extend” to them, Bose Corp. v. Consum-
ers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984); Sable Commc’ns of 
Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989). Such statements must be 
taken in context, however, and are no more literally true than is the 
occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity “as not being 
speech at all,” Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amend-
ment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 615 n.146. What they mean is that these 
areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regu-
lated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, 
defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely invis-
ible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for con-
tent discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable con-
tent. 
505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992). 
 161. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 162. This struggle produced Justice Potter Stewart’s famous submission 
that while he could not define what was obscene, he “know[s] it when [he] see[s] 
it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 163. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (modifying and ar-
guably rejecting the Roth-Memoirs test to conclude that a work may be regu-
lated if: (a) “‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest”; 
(b) “the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”); Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (expanding the Roth test to permit 
regulation only if “(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole ap-
peals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because 
it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or 
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeem-
ing social value”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (holding that 
material was obscene if “to the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to 
prurient interest”). 
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terms of its value to community in which it resided.164 Likewise, 
in the context of political speech, community values and norms 
have driven the constitutionally permissible regulation of 
speech. Early Red Scare cases of the 1910s and 1920s criminal-
ized the speech of socialists, anarchists, and communists in the 
name of national security.165 Today the pamphleteering, meet-
ings, and soap box oratory of these activists seem more quaint 
than threatening. Later cases struck down the regulation of sub-
versive speech unless that speech intentionally incited people to 
cause imminent and serious harm.166 
Inherent in this shift was an assessment of the danger the 
speech itself presented. And, at the end of the day, the assess-
ment of that danger, as with its obscene cousin, lay with the cit-
izen juror in whose midst the speech occurred.167 As the citizen’s 
fear of obscene, subversive, or non-conformist speech shifted, so 
too did their willingness to criminalize and punish such 
speech.168 Admittedly this shift is a fraught proposition, and one 
not without interference from formal actors. Accusations of fo-
rum shopping,169 puritanical veto of nonconforming speech,170 
 
 164. In prior cases, the Court had considered the immoral effect of the 
speech. Compare Roth, 354 U.S. at 487–89 (rejecting the test articulated in Re-
gina v. Hicklin [1868] 3 QB 360, 481 (Eng.) determining the potential effect of 
the speech on youth in particular), with William B. Lockhart & Robert C. 
McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 
MINN. L. REV. 5, 77 (1960) (arguing that after Roth, “material is judged by its 
appeal to and effect upon the audience to which the material is primarily di-
rected. In this view, material is never inherently obscene; instead, its obscenity 
varies with the circumstances of its dissemination. Material may be obscene 
when directed to one class of persons but not when directed to another”). 
 165. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (finding the state an-
archy statute constitutional); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–17 
(1919) (holding speech about socialism was not protected when the purpose was 
to oppose war); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (finding speech 
unprotected in wartime that might be said in times of speech). 
 166. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969). 
 167. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301–03 (1977) (holding that 
the state legislature’s isolation from the community itself precluded the legisla-
ture from setting community standards for the purpose of determining obscen-
ity); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974) (holding that citizen 
jurors were entitled to draw on their own experiences and knowledge in obscen-
ity cases). 
 168. See infra notes 169–70. 
 169. See Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity 
Cases? The Ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s Groundbreaking Understanding 
of Community Standards in Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REV. 47, 56–57 (2010) (de-
scribing the government’s use of forum shopping in pornography cases to find 
communities that would convict). 
 170. See Alyson Walls, Prosecutors Seek Conservative Venues for Porn Trials, 
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and contextual acceptance171 all arise particularly in the face of 
modern obscenity regulation. Coupled with discretionary deci-
sion making by prosecutors and police forces in the enforcement 
of law, this has produced an ever-shifting classification of low-
value speech. 
The development of a speech jurisprudence dependent on 
citizen evaluation of speech content is premised on a notion that 
the proliferation of speech—including speech that is non-con-
formist or (as will be discussed in the context of time, place, or 
manner restrictions) that must be subsidized to exist—is valua-
ble to the democracy.172 This creates a paradox of sorts—a vision 
 
PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV. (May 18, 2004), https://webarchive.org/web/ 
20080114025700/http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_194571 
.html (discussing federal prosecutors’ tendency to prosecute obscenity cases in 
more conservative communities). 
 171. Nudity, including the usually fatal combination of nudity coupled with 
sadomasochistic violence, may be acceptable if presented as a fifteenth century 
triptych warning of the dangers of sin, but may be more problematic if presented 
as a homoerotic depiction displayed in the Midwest. Compare HIERONYMUS 
BOSCH, THE GARDEN OF EARTHLY DELIGHTS, Panel 2 (c. 1490–1510), https:// 
www.museodelprado.es/en/the-collection/art-work/the-garden-of-earthly 
-delights-triptych/02388242-6d6a-4e9e-a992-e1311eab3609 (fifteenth century 
triptych oil painting depicting earthly pleasures such as nudity and sex juxta-
posed with a depiction of hell), with ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE, ROBERT MAPPLE-
THORPE: PERFECT MOMENT (Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center Exhibit 
1990) (describing how the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center, which dis-
played the photographs, along with the Director of the Center, was tried for 
alleged violations of Ohio obscenity laws for displaying a homoerotic depiction 
of nudity in City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Art Ctr., 566 N.E.2d 207 (Ohio 
Mun. Ct. 1990)). A selection of these photographs as displayed in 1990 can be 
viewed in Grace Dobush’s article, 25 Years Later: Cincinnati and the Obscenity 
Trial over Mapplethorpe Art, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/25-years-later-cincinnati-and 
-the-obscenity-trial-over-mapplethorpe-art/2015/10/22/07c6aba2-6dcb-11e5 
-9bfe-e59f5e244f92_story.html (follow “View Photos” hyperlink; then follow left 
arrow hyperlink). 
 172. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“[I]t is a prized 
American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good 
taste, on all public institutions . . . and this opportunity is to be afforded for 
‘vigorous advocacy’ no less than ‘abstract discussion.’” (first quoting Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941); and then quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 429 (1963))); id. at 270 (explaining that democracy requires a commit-
ment to the notion that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” (citing Termini-
ello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949))); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 
(1957) (stating the First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered inter-
change of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people”); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword, Traces of Self-Government, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (1986) (“[I]ts requisite forum is ‘a political community of 
equals,’ where individual reason corresponds to public rational debate) (quoting 
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of free speech rights that is simultaneously both “anti-regula-
tory” and “pro-regulatory.” It is anti-regulatory in the sense that 
it anticipates that the First Amendment permits all but the most 
dangerous or socially costly speech.173 Citizens and not the gov-
ernment draw the boundaries of this speech. But it is also pro-
regulatory as it imagines that in the face of resource inequality, 
the government at times must mandate the creation of spaces 
for minority speech to occur.174 In both its regulatory and anti-
regulatory stances, the ideal of the First Amendment as a means 
of promoting equality and free thought is one that seeks to ad-
vance democratic values by promoting speech and promoting cit-
izen participation in the assessment of speech.175 
This vision in turn embraces an anti-discrimination, pro-
speech perspective that promotes and protects marginalized 
speech in the face of majority opposition or apathy.176 Relying on 
citizens to themselves assess the inherent value of the speech in 
question not only prevents a top down regulatory model of 
speech, but it may promote speech that otherwise occupies a 
fringe status.177 This may occur in two ways. First, jurors may 
reject the criminalization of certain speech because they view it 
as having a potential value. As a result, defendants will be ac-
quitted or, perhaps, prosecutors will decline even to charge 
 
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HER-
MENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983)). 
 173. Cf. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103 (1974) (citing Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 31–32 (1973) (discussing that the First Amendment 
does not require juries to consider national standards). 
 174. Most recently, consider Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission. Adopting an equality-based vision of the First 
Amendment, Stevens argued that the need to limit corporate contribution and 
speech in the political context is born of the power of corporate resources. Citi-
zens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 394 (2010) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). Stevens noted that corporations could muster and deploy resources “on 
a scale few natural persons can match.” Id. at 469. In the process, corporations 
can dominate forums of speech, “drowning out . . . noncorporate voices . . . .” Id. 
at 470. To promote equality, therefore, Stevens contended that the government 
properly regulated corporate financing of speech, leaving room in the process 
for less flush endeavors to speak. Id. at 431–32, 485. 
 175. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (observing that the First Amendment “was 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes . . . .”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: 
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 112 (1980) (espousing the notion that the First 
Amendment promotes democracy by “assuring an open political dialogue and 
process”). 
 176. See Sullivan, supra note 150, at 149–50. 
 177. See id. at 155. 
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speakers, as they recognize juror preferences.178 Second, even as 
jurors may decline to find a redeeming value in some speech, in 
rejecting the free speech defense, they nonetheless preserve a 
space for voices that might otherwise be targeted for their un-
popular or anti-majoritarian views by drawing boundaries that 
would permit other speech. These boundaries, in turn, evolve as 
different speech norms emerge and social values change. Early 
pamphleteering, while initially unprotected, would now be un-
likely to raise community ire, just as images of a topless adult 
women, once scandalous, are now widely accepted as expressive 
and permissible.179 
This is not to say that content-based regulation, or more ac-
curately, a citizen-based-assessment of the speech content, is the 
sole source or champion of an equality-based vision of speech.180 
Nor is it to say that citizen-based assessment of content is always 
liberating to minority perspectives; it usually is not.181 In fact, 
the Supreme Court’s development of an equality-based model in-
cludes formalized components that are both protective and pro-
motive in the face of unsympathetic informal citizen-based com-
ponents—including regulatory components based on something 
other than the content of the speech itself.182 In promoting equal-
ity through content regulation, the government acts in both neg-
ative and affirmative postures—guarding against content-based 
regulation of speech and promoting speech whose content is un-
popular or marginalized.183 At first blush this may seem to cut 
against a system that relies on and allows the citizenry to di-
rectly judge and evaluate the value of speech.184 Reality, how-
ever, belies this first impression. By rigging the marketplace of 
 
 178. See Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (describing the influence of acquittal on future charg-
ing decisions). 
 179. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“Un-
der our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent 
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.”). 
 180. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 150, at 149 (discussing using the First 
Amendment to “redistribute speaking power”). 
 181. See infra Part IV. 
 182. See infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (arguing for regulating speech to promote equality); Sulli-
van, supra note 150 (discussing a vision with affirmative action to promote mar-
ginal speech). 
 184. See Sullivan, supra note 150, at 145 (“[T]he First Amendment is a neg-
ative check on government tyranny, and treats with skepticism all government 
efforts at speech suppression that might skew the private ordering of ideas.”). 
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ideas—that is, by removing some or restricting other speech—
the government allows majoritarian positions to flourish. The 
Court, in promoting equality, seeks to prevent those positions 
from stifling countervailing perspectives to the point of extinc-
tion, and in turn allows for the continued evolution of thought 
and community norms.185 
There is no denying that this is an active judicial role. 
Elected governments, after all, are less likely to regulate main-
stream or popular speech in comparison to more unusual, unor-
thodox or minority speech. It therefore falls to the Court to pro-
tect this outlier speech by removing government-based 
restrictions and promoting equality in speech in the process.186 
As such, the Court redistributes speaking power and removes 
requirements for allegiance to a particular perspective in ex-
change for an allocation of resources.187 The preservation of com-
peting ideals and ideas—whether in the creation of public fo-
rums in streets, parks, town squares, or in the form of striking 
down particularly aggressive forms of content regulation—all 
serve not only as a subsidy for dissent and otherwise resource-
deprived speech, but also to enrich an ongoing public conversa-
tion about the value of speech itself.188 As discussed in Section 
B, beyond content based regulation of speech, content neutral 
regulation in the form of time, place, or manner restrictions also 
effect significant swaths of speech.189 
B. REGULATING SPEECH BY TIME, PLACE, OR MANNER 
In contrast, regulation of speech based on its impact on some 
other right does not inquire into the content of the speech except 
as such content affects the other right in question.190 Such time, 
 
 185. See id. at 150–52. 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (invalidat-
ing decisions to criminalize flag burnings as protest); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 420 (1989) (same); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (de-
viating from prior cases in which the Court had permitted the regulation of “se-
ditious” speech and prohibiting government regulation of subversive speech, un-
less it intentionally incites people to cause imminent and likely harm); N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring public official to 
show actual malice in libel suits, so protecting the ability to criticize the govern-
ment). 
 187. See Sullivan, supra note 150, at 149. 
 188. See id. at 149–52. 
 189. See infra Part B. 
 190. See, e.g., infra note 192. 
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place, or manner regulations seek to control how speech is pre-
sented—not what speech is presented.191 The Court has repeat-
edly permitted reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions so 
long as such restrictions are content-neutral, are narrowly tai-
lored to serve government interests, and leave open ample alter-
native means of expression.192 This type of regulation considers 
other interests—most commonly property interests—in contrast 
to speech interests.193 Thus private property owners may regu-
late speech on their own property (and use the state to enforce 
the regulation) not because the speech is “low-value” but because 
the speech occurs on their property.194 Likewise, even in public 
forums—spaces traditionally or recently made available for pub-
lic use, including speech use—the state may regulate speech in 
the interest of promoting competing interests.195 Though the reg-
ulation may curtail speech, it does not, as a matter of constitu-
tional law, render it impermissible.196 
In recent free speech cases, the Court has considered a slight 
variation on traditional time, place, or manner restrictions. Cit-
izens United struck down a regulation that limited corporate fi-
nancing of political speech, and in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the 
Court was asked to consider whether a cake is speech.197 Both 
 
 191. See Michael Anthony Lawrence, Government as Liberty’s Servant: The 
“Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner” Standard of Review for All Government 
Restrictions on Liberty Interests, 68 LA. L. REV. 1, 48 (2007). 
 192. See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (finding the law 
regulating demonstrations was too broad); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 
(1941) (requiring parade organizers to have a license and pay a fee on a public 
street). 
 193. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (balancing the in-
terests of regulating expression on private property). At times such property 
interests and rights are linked to other interests such as national security or 
public safety, the idea being that the use of the property for the speech interferes 
with such interests. Cf. Laura S. Underkuffler, When Should Rights “Trump?” 
An Examination of Speech and Property, 52 ME. L. REV. 312, 315 (2000) 
(“[R]ights of individuals are usually contrasted with public-interest demands.”). 
 194. See Craig L. Finder, Rights of Shopping Center Owners to Regulate Free 
Speech and Public Disclosure, IN THE ZONE (Fox Rothschild), Oct. 2011, at 1 
(“[S]tates generally protect the rights of private property owners to enact regu-
lations governing political protests, demonstrations and similar activities on 
their properties.”). 
 195. The public forum designation is a contested proposition as well with 
lower courts upholding restrictions on public parks, streets, sidewalks, and 
other traditional locations of speech for safety or community interests. See Perry 
Educ. Assoc. v. Perry Local Educs. Assoc., 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). 
 196. See id. at 55. 
 197. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719 (2018); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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these cases involve whether to equate property—money or a 
cake—with speech, confronting the argument that content-neu-
tral government regulations impermissibly interfere with a 
property interest that coincides with the owner’s speech inter-
est.198 
This jurisprudential conversation between speech and prop-
erty is hardly new. The early conception of the First Amendment 
drew heavily on notions of speech as property and viewed gov-
ernmental speech restrictions as property incursions.199 While 
this treatment of speech and corresponding First Amendment 
rights waned during particular judicial eras, it has persisted by 
pushing back on the notion that a liberty interest such as speech 
is different from other, more tangible interests such as prop-
erty.200 
In many ways this marriage, or perhaps more accurately, 
this single identity of speech (or any liberty) as a property inter-
est, has served proponents of speech well.201 The same liberty 
interest that forbid the government from breaking down doors in 
the middle of the night on a whim also prevented the government 
from forcing one to remove signs from yards or windows, or forc-
ing another to post such a sign. The same liberty interest that 
designated the sidewalk a common space—a shared property of 
sorts—prevented the government from blocking the path of a 
protest or the pamphleteer on the same sidewalk, and likewise 
prevented the government from forcing a private property owner 
to accommodate a speaker.202 
Linking speech and property as analogous liberty interests 
also made sense at the Founding. The mechanisms of speech the 
 
Though arguably the First Amendment claim advanced in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop was about whether or not the shop owner could be compelled to speak 
in a particular way and thus took on a content component. Ultimately, the ma-
jority declined to rule broadly on the speech issue. 
 198. See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719; Citizens United, 
588 U.S. 310. 
 199. See John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of 
the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 58–71 (1996) (describing Madison’s 
vision of the First Amendment as protection against government seizure of the 
means of speech, such as the printing press or burning books, as opposed to 
government regulation of spoken word). 
 200. Id. at 71–72. 
 201. Id. at 57 (“[A] property-based system in which the First Amendment 
simply protects the individual’s right to transmit his information is more likely 
to result in sound collective governance, and the accumulation of socially bene-
ficial knowledge . . . .”). 
 202. See Sullivan, supra note 150, at 158–63. 
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Founders sought to protect—their presses and pamphlets—were 
property.203 And perhaps more importantly, they were property 
produced by the same folks who owned real property.204 The 
Founders’ allegiance to the budding republican democracy was 
an allegiance to a world in which property itself was the key to 
the realm.205 One’s status as a real property owner granted ac-
cess to vote, to membership in government (including the bench), 
to a seat in a jury box, and, in some jurisdictions, to the very 
identity as a citizen.206 
Property, however, is not a static concept. Common law 
property rights were vague nearly from their conception—even-
tually coming to be described as a bundle of often unruly sticks 
that could be taken apart or unfurled in the name of competing 
interests.207 Notions of easements, public right of ways, restric-
tive covenants—to name a few—all were historically deemed 
permissible curtailments of real property rights in the name of 
the larger social good.208 The identity of property has also 
shifted. People are no longer property—slavery is outlawed, and 
wives and children are no longer imagined to be the subordinate 
property of the husband and father.209 Property in the modern 
 
 203. See McGinnis, supra note 199, at 56–57, 60–61. 
 204. See id. at 58–71 (discussing the Madisonian First Amendment). 
 205. In Boyd v. United States, the Court, interpreting the Founders’ senti-
ment underlying the Fourth Amendment, quoted Lord Camden: “The great end 
for which men entered into society was to secure their property. That right is 
preserved sacred and incommunicable . . .” 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886). The case 
that Boyd quoted, Entick v. Carrington, further noted that “every invasion of 
private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.” Entick v. Carrington (1765) 
Eng. Rep. 1029, 1066. 
 206. See Andrew Gurthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2014) (discussing property owners as being al-
lowed to serve on juries); Donald Ratcliffe, The Right to Vote and the Rise of 
Democracy, 1787-1828, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 219, 220 (2013) (discussing re-
quiring property in order to vote). 
 207. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 
(1928) (describing property as a bundle of rights); Richard A. Epstein, Was New 
York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 801 (1986) (same). 
 208. See Bob Meinig, What Is the Nature of a Public Right-of-Way?, MRSC 
(Jan. 2, 2014), http://mrsc.org/Home/Stay-Informed/MRSC-Insight/January 
-2014/What-is-the-Nature-of-a-Public-Right-of-Way.aspx (discussing ease-
ments and public right of ways). 
 209. See Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, 
in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE 
CONTEMPORARY 105, 133 (Jean Allain ed., 2012). 
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world is also disentangled from the tangible. Reputation is de-
scribed as a property interest.210 A person cannot be owned, but 
she can claim ownership to her own good name. Likewise, intel-
lectual property has emerged as a brave, new property world.211 
Ideas that may never take on a tangible form may nonetheless 
exist and receive protection as property. 
Just as property notions have shifted, so have notions of de-
mocracy itself. With increasing enfranchisement and civil rights 
activism, democracy and property disentangled themselves from 
the ideals of rights and identity. So too the meaning of the rhet-
oric of speech has shifted. The Founders’ characterization of 
speech as necessary to promote the democracy morphed over 
time and through judicial rulings into an equality theory of 
speech that required the defense and promotion minority or op-
pressed perspectives.212 This is not to say that property rights 
were ceded with this shift. Indeed, one way to reconcile the ten-
dency to uphold property interests (particularly private property 
interests) over speech interests may be to see speech as a com-
ponent liberty that recedes in the face of more rigorous property 
interests.213 
Regardless of whether or not one accepts this vision of 
speech as a component of property, jurisprudence surrounding 
time, place, manner restrictions—whether traditional or more 
recent—resides in the notion that the right to speech is akin to 
any other individual right. As such it should exist for the most 
part in a sphere beyond government control—as with the content 
regulation doctrine—but must also give way in the face of other 
more compelling interests.214 Even protected speech, therefore, 
may be regulated—not for its content but for its collision with 
property interests.215 Likewise, speech may not be regulated if 
the speech in question is linked to the property right itself. Re-
source-poor speech, for example, may not expropriate another’s 
property for its purposes.216 Nor may speech regulation restrict 
 
 210. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 207, at 801 (discussing reputational inter-
ests as “property” interests). 
 211. See McGinnis, supra note 199, at 100–18 (discussing the rise of intel-
lectual property-based property and speech claims). 
 212. See supra notes 174–86 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Shelley Ross Saxer, A Property Rights View: Commentary on Prop-
erty and Speech by Robert A. Sedler, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 155, 160–61 
(2006). 
 214. See supra note 195. 
 215. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412–13 n.8 (1989) (noting that 
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an owner’s use of their own property to promote speech even if 
that use excludes all others.217 
This regulation of speech based on its impact may produce 
odd results. Nazis may be permitted to march through the center 
of predominantly Jewish towns,218 and crosses may be burned in 
Black families’ yards.219 Union protestors, however, may not as-
semble without a permit,220 nor may anti-racism musicians turn 
their amps up to eleven221 after ten o’clock at night in a city that 
reportedly never sleeps.222 If the regulation of speech based on 
content is decidedly democratic—relying on citizens to judge the 
value of the speech with courts interceding in an effort to pro-
mote equality—then content neutral regulation is decidedly non-
populist. The Court’s jurisprudence in the area of time, place, or 
manner restrictions does not seek input from the citizenry as to 
how to weigh the value of speech in comparison to that of prop-
erty.223 
Despite its non-populist approach, regulating speech based 
on its disruption of property interests points to a judicial con-
struct of free speech as promoting liberty by checking the gov-
ernment’s power to regulate private actors. In this sense, the cit-
izen’s interests are promoted by the absence of government 
interference. In situations where property rights and speech in-
terests clash, the property owner may assert a claim that he is 
entitled to preserve the sanctity of his property interests even in 
the face of compelling, important, or generally desired speech.224 
As with any doctrine, there are exceptions. Graffiti abate-
ment statutes that require the removal of even desired graffiti 
 
while the Court concluded that one could burn an American flag in protest, one 
could not steal a flag and burn it); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–17 
(1977) (holding that New Hampshire may not force drivers to display a message 
on their vehicles); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976) (holding un-
ions could not picket their employer’s office space without his permission). 
 217. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 325–26 
(2010). 
 218. See Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 
(1977). 
 219. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992). 
 220. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939). 
 221. See THIS IS SPINAL TAP: THE OFFICIAL COMPANION 30 (2000) (noting 
“[t]hese [amplifiers] go to eleven”). 
 222. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989). 
 223. See supra notes 187–92 and accompanying text. 
 224. Admittedly this is not always the case. As will be discussed, there are 
times when the government has forced property owners to provide a forum for 
speech in the interest of promoting equality, even at the cost of liberties. See 
infra notes 227–32 and accompanying text. 
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pieces may undermine the ability of the property owner to exer-
cise his full property rights.225 In the case of libel, one’s reputa-
tion—which under common law was treated as a property inter-
est—may nonetheless be reallocated in the face of speech 
interests.226 
In addition, the Court has preserved forums of expression, 
even those on private property, when equality interests appear 
to mandate curtailing property rights in the interest of preserv-
ing marginalized speech.227 In recognizing public forums—
whether traditional or of more modern construct—the Court 
carves out spaces for speech, even in the face of competing prop-
erty interests.228 Likewise, the Court’s jurisprudence in the con-
text of libel represents another example in which dissenting or 
 
 225. See, e.g., Mettler, supra note 20, at 256. 
 226. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (finding imposing damages on 
the newspaper for publishing a victim’s name violates the First Amendment); 
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Connecticut, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (finding government can-
not restrict the publication of truthful information); see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring an actual malice standard for defamation 
suits). 
 227. See Amalgamated Food Empls. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza 
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 
(1976) (holding that workers’ speech interests overrode private property owner’s 
regulation of speech in a shopping center); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 511 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Title to property as defined by State law 
controls property relations; it cannot control issues of civil liberties which arise 
precisely because a company town is a town.”). This is admittedly a fickle and 
imprecisely demarcated case line. See, e.g., Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507 (holding un-
ion members had no constitutional right to picket an employer located in a pri-
vately-owned shopping center); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) 
(holding that there was no First Amendment right to protest on private property 
when the speech was unrelated to the property itself ) . In his dissent in Hudg-
ens, Justice Marshall argued that there is an inseparable relationship between 
private property and speech rights. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 543 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (“[P]roperty does become ‘clothed with a public interest when used in a 
manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large.’” 
(quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877))).  
 228. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
512–14 (1969); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573–75 (1968) (both 
striking down punishment of speakers who addressed matters of public concern 
in a school and workplace, respectively); see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Ve-
lazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 
364, 402 (1984); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528–29 (1958) (differing 
slightly from the previous cases, all holding that the government cannot condi-
tion a grant of benefits or funds based on the speaker’s allegiance to or expres-
sion of a particular perspective).  
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critical speech is preserved, even as it clashes with private prop-
erty interests.229 Finally, the Court has held that while the fed-
eral Constitution may not always preserve speech rights in the 
face of property interests, state constitutions may preserve such 
speech rights even if such preservation contradicts federal case 
law.230 Each of these examples recast time, place, or manner re-
strictions in terms of interests in equality, as opposed to lib-
erty.231 These cases recognize that there may be times when the 
government must and should subsidize dissenting speech as 
such speech serves a democratic function of presenting counter-
vailing, and often critical, perspectives.232 This preserving space 
for speech has receded in recent cases. Most notably in Citizens 
United, the Court drew a direct line between property interests 
and speech rights, in the process arguably jeopardizing past ef-
forts to preserve forums for underfunded, dissenting, or unortho-
dox speech.233 Coupled with recent argument in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, the emerging free speech doctrine would seem to pro-
mote a deregulating speech in the interest of preserving liberty 
over an interest in promoting equality. This claim, however, ar-
guably overlooks the entwined nature of promoting equality and 
protecting liberty. 
Preserving speech in the face of property interests is not in 
fact irreconcilable with a notion of speech as liberty. Admittedly, 
the portrayal of speech in liberty terms is one that adheres to a 
notion that the ideals of the First Amendment flourish in a free 
market of ideas. In this imaginary marketplace, dissenting 
voices are left to their own devices to thrive or wither based on 
their ability to carve their own space in the public conscience. 
This theoretical free flow of information allows citizens to weigh 
and consider competing and complementary ideas and to choose 
among them. To view speech as liberty—a freedom worthy of in-
dependent defense, as opposed to a mere tool of other freedoms—
might therefore be to reject regulation that seeks either to alter 
the balance of speaking power by redistributing access to re-
sources or spaces for speech or to prioritize one type of speaker 
 
 229. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 230. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding 
states can provide broader rights that do not infringe on federal constitutional 
rights). 
 231. See Sullivan, supra note 150, at 150–51. 
 232. See id. 
 233. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Sul-
livan, supra note 150, at 145 (discussing Citizens United as “representing a tri-
umph of the libertarian over the egalitarian vision of free speech”).  
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over another. This line of thinking, after all, is the same that 
permits the government to prohibit, restrict, or regulate speak-
ers in public forums on a theory that the government cannot and 
should not subsidize speech.234 It also permits the government 
to condition the grant of government resources—including fund-
ing—on the promotion of a particular perspective on the theory 
that the government is not obligated to subsidize speech in the 
first place.235 
This traditional conception of speech as liberty however, 
overlooks the looming reality that some ideas may never have 
the opportunity to enter the marketplace of ideas without gov-
ernment assistance. Under this vision, to believe that ideas 
should be permitted to compete in a market of ideas is also to 
believe that such ideas should be granted a space to enter the 
market in the first place.236 By promoting regulation of property 
as a means to ensure the existence of some types of speech, cases 
that promote speech as a matter of equality, therefore, promote 
it as a matter of liberty interests as well—promoting regulation 
of property as a means to ensure the existence of some types of 
speech. 
C. SPEECH, CRIMINAL LAW, AND SPACES FOR DISSENT 
Regardless of whether the regulation in question is based on 
the type of speech or the manner of the speech, criminal law 
serves as the primary enforcer of such regulations and at times 
offers a “speech” defense.237 On the one hand, illicit speech such 
as graffiti is rarely regulated based on its content, but instead 
for its effect on property.238 Applying a pure free speech analysis 
to graffiti would therefore suggest that in the context of private 
property, no speech defense should exist, and in the context of 
public forums, a speech defense would be limited. On the other 
 
 234. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (affirming removal of 
protesters from government-owned jail property by refusing to value speech 
rights over other lawful designated uses of the property). 
 235. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991). 
 236. See infra notes 249–83, and accompanying text. 
 237. Cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254 (discussing a “truth” de-
fense to criminal libel charges under state statute). This is not to say that crim-
inal law is the only enforcer. Certainly, there is a robust body of civil law that 
enforces speech regulation by subjecting offending speakers to tort liability or 
civil fines, but criminal law remains a primary form of government enforcement 
of speech regulation. 
 238. See supra notes 41–42, and accompanying text. 
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hand, this neat dichotomy of content versus content-neutral reg-
ulation becomes problematic in the context of speech such as 
graffiti, in which the communication itself is embedded in the 
mechanism of the speech.239 For some speech, to regulate where, 
when, or how it can occur is to regulate it out of existence.240 The 
content of this speech is thus regulated in the shadow of the con-
tent-neutral regulation. 
A similar argument has been posited by legal realists in the 
context of harmful speech.241 Such scholars argue that when the 
First Amendment is understood to forbid regulation of speech 
that is known to cause harm—because to do so would be content-
based—it has the effect of silencing speakers most affected by 
the harmful speech.242 To permit the use of an insulting racial 
epithet is to create a hostile marketplace of ideas in which an 
already marginalized speaker may feel unable to respond in kind 
with speech. That speech is boxed in and walled out by a domi-
nant perspective that promotes the bias and inequality that the 
epithet epitomizes.243 As a result, content neutrality is not neu-
tral. It merely supports dominant paradigms and mainstream 
ideologies.244 It closes a space for speech that does not conform 
or quietly and politely offer resistance.245 Simply put the playing 
field of speech is not level. Not all speech is equal, and a free 
marketplace of ideas is only free to those who have either little 
to lose with their speech (and so are willing to accept the conse-
quences of regulation), or who control the means and mecha-
nisms by which speech is disseminated. 
This critique is particularly relevant in a post-Citizens 
United world. To talk about speech, particularly political speech, 
 
 239. See supra notes 47–81, and accompanying text. 
 240. For an example of this outside of the context of graffiti, see infra notes 
249–55 and accompanying text. 
 241. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Ap-
proaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 380–83; Richard Del-
gado, First Amendment Formalism Is Giving Way to First Amendment Legal 
Realism, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 171 (1994); Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic, Southern Dreams and A New Theory of First Amendment Legal Real-
ism, 65 EMORY L.J. 303, 313–14 (2015); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of 
Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 17–22 (1984). 
 242. Ingber, supra note 241, at 17–22. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See KENNEDY, supra note 82; cf. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, 
MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST 
AMENDMENT 161 (1997) (describing hate speech as a weapon used by the em-
powered to maintain their social position in the face of growing opposition). 
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is to talk about money and access to forums.246 Access, in turn, 
is defined in terms of either the speaker’s own resources or his 
ability to conform his message to majoritarian positions. In this 
world, a formal guarantee of a right to speak without interfer-
ence may mean very little in the face of radically unequal eco-
nomic and social power. Any egalitarian value in free speech is 
reduced by the reality that all speech may be constitutionally 
stifled by content-neutral regulations that have the decided ef-
fect of restricting access to means and forums of speech. 
A formalistic content-neutral approach to speech rights as-
sumes at its core that all parties (or viewpoints) have the ability 
to exercise speech rights.247 Or in the alternative, it takes the 
position that the suppression of some speech through content-
neutral regulation does no harm.248 Either perspective is trou-
bling, and either produces an end result in which some types of 
speech will have few forums of expression, and others will enjoy 
near carte blanche access to an audience. This seems an odd out-
come under a theory of free speech doctrine designed to promote 
equality, but it is equally troubling under a theory of free speech 
that seeks to promote liberty. And while this dilemma is more 
pronounced in the context of privately-owned forums, the exist-
ence of public forums for speech does not solve this problem. 
Consider, the public forum case Hague v. CIO.249 Frank 
Hague, the mayor of Jersey City, sought to enforce an ordinance 
that prohibited public meetings in public places without a per-
mit.250 Hague, in an effort to break up CIO union organizing ef-
forts, declined to issue such a permit.251 His strategy was to 
thwart the CIO’s purposes by making it impossible for the CIO 
to engage in any expressive conduct within Jersey City.252 As 
time, place, or manner restrictions go, Hague’s scheme was clas-
sic. The restriction in question—a permit requirement for speech 
on public property—was agnostic as to the content of the speech 
itself.253 
 
 246. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 580 U.S. 310, 339 (2010). 
 247. See Ingber, supra note 241, at 10. 
 248. This approach also sometimes takes the approach that the suppression 
of speech does less harm than the non-regulation of the speech to competing 
rights and interests. 
 249. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion). 
 250. Id. at 501. 
 251. Id. at 501–02 (discussing Hague’s decision not to issue a permit). 
 252. See Balkin, supra note 241, at 400 n.57. 
 253. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 502, 502 & n.1. 
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Unable to obtain a permit for their speech, the CIO was still 
free to engage it its expressive activity.254 It could purchase or 
rent private property on which to speak or it could speak on prop-
erty it already owned.255 The problem was the CIO, like many 
dissident speakers, did not own property and lacked the eco-
nomic means to acquire it. That a market existed where they 
might hypothetically acquire a forum for their speech was of lit-
tle solace to the CIO. 
Even if the CIO could afford to purchase property or access 
to property, it was unlikely to be able to privately acquire prop-
erty that fostered the CIO’s expressive purpose in the same way 
as the public forum it originally sought.256 The CIO protestors 
chose the location of their speech for a reason. It was linked to 
the effectiveness of their communication itself, but it was also 
part and parcel of their communication. For their speech rights 
to be real, they required access to a place of meaningful commu-
nication. Rights, the CIO claimed, must mean more than an abil-
ity in a literal sense to exercise them. Such rights must take into 
account the ability to disseminate the message itself. Speech 
that is never heard is the equivalent of no speech at all. 
Under an equality theory, the regulation of speech based on 
access to mechanisms and forums of speech would seem to de-
mand a proactive leveling of the speech field.257 Under a theory 
of speech as liberty, regulating of speech in absolute terms based 
on access to forums would seem to overvalue property rights and 
interests in a way that has not made sense perhaps since the 
Founding. 
Current treatment of outsider speech regulated by time, 
place, or manner restrictions—which swings on fulcrums of com-
peting interests and available alternative forms—offers little 
more than a guarantee of form-based liberty, and by default 
 
 254. Id. at 506 (discussing the lower courts’ rulings regarding Hague’s per-
mit requirement). 
 255. It is possible that under the City’s ordinance, even a rally on private 
property might have been subject to the permit requirement in question. See id. 
at 502 n.1; Balkin, supra note 241, at 400 n.57. The Court did not reach this 
issue, so it is impossible to know if such a private gathering would have been 
possible without a permit, or in the alternative, if Hague would have issued the 
permit if it were required. Id. at 515–16 (noting the limited scope of the ruling). 
 256. See Balkin, supra note 241, at 400–01. 
 257. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 
108–14 (1993) (arguing that government subsidy of free speech promotes a more 
open marketplace of ideas); Ingber, supra note 241, at 403 (arguing that the 
marketplace of ideas is premised on the false notion that citizens make rational 
decisions in prioritizing ideas and speech). 
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form-based equality.258 Under this construct, all, in theory, have 
an equal opportunity to realize speech rights, but in reality, the 
realization of these rights is ultimately unequal. Setting aside 
formal promises of access, such guarantees are, by their nature, 
unequal. They favor those who are already the most favored and 
powerful.259 They ring hollow in the face of speech that is created 
and exists in defiance of the very rights and values that formal-
ism favors. 
While a time, place, or manner restriction may not literally 
endorse particular content, this form-based speech protection 
will not guarantee a substantive liberty to speak or substantive 
equality for that speech. Quite the contrary, it is more likely to 
undermine the substantive goal. In this, the formal right to 
speech—the right to be free from content-based regulation—is 
less about the protection of speech and more about questions of 
access to the places where and the means by which speech is per-
mitted. 
In reality, formal speech equality withers in the face of sub-
stantive economic inequality. As the Court permits the contrac-
tions of public forums of speech, the right to speak is bought by 
those who can afford the private forums in which to lawfully ex-
ercise the right as they please. Private property owners can post 
a sign in their own yard. Or if the yard is big enough, they can 
host a rally to promote their perspective without offending time, 
place, or manner restrictions. Those with resources can rent a 
hall or pay for a permit, sound systems (and their accompanying 
sound technicians), added security—all in the interest of promot-
ing their content while complying with their jurisdictions’ time, 
place, or manner restrictions. Following the Court’s decision in 
Citizens United, those able to purchase media access can publi-
cize their viewpoint knowing that, with little government regu-
lation over corporate based campaign contributions, those able 
to court the largest donors will have the capital to purchase fo-
rums of speech.260 And the free market will ensure that those 
unable to secure large quantities of capital will be priced out of 
the speech market. The marketplace of ideas descends to the tyr-
anny of the actual marketplace. 
Viewed in this way, those most in need of open forums of 
speech—the true outside perspective—will bear the brunt force 
 
 258. See Balkin, supra note 241, at 403. 
 259. See Ingber, supra note 241, at 86–87. 
 260. See Manjarrez, supra note 13; Rice, supra note 50; Sullivan, supra note 
150. 
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of content-neutral regulations. The First Amendment question, 
—whether couched in terms of equality or liberty,—is turned on 
its head. The problem is no longer that government restrains 
speech, but that private actors present the most serious impedi-
ment to the realization of the substantive right. 
The State, for its part, controls access to forums of speech in 
two senses. First it controls public property. And second, it al-
lows private property owners to place an economic tariff on 
speech rights by allowing them to deny access to their property 
without compensation. As the Court defended the government’s 
right to deny access to public forums for students protesting seg-
regation in Adderly on the grounds that “[t]he State, no less than 
a private owner of property has the right to preserve the prop-
erty under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedi-
cated,” it endorsed the position that the private owner’s property 
rights override any competing third-party claim to free 
speech.261 
In Hague, the Court created “a kind of First Amendment 
easement” to permit speech on public streets and parks in defi-
ance of Hague’s permit requirement.262 The solution is interest-
ing. It arguably redistributes the burden that free speech must 
bear to the government and away from private citizens and their 
property.263 The true effect of the easement, however, may in fact 
only shift the type of burden that private citizens bear away from 
access to their private real property and onto increased collective 
financial burdens as citizens in the community bear the cost of 
street clean up, increased security, and other associated costs.264 
Beyond this, the proposition of a public-only easement causes 
questions about the equality of forums to resurface. An easement 
for speech may well consign dissenting voices to locations and 
forums utterly disconnected from the very message those voices 
seek to communicate. 
Since the Court’s decision in 1939, indeed in the last ten 
years, there has been a proliferation of private forums that are 
distinct from those contemplated by the Hague or even Adderly 
 
 261. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). 
 262. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 25 F. Supp. 127, 145–46, 151 (D. 
N.J. 1938) (first proposing the public easement for speech), aff ’d as modified, 
307 U.S. 496 (1939); Balkin, supra note 241, at 402 (describing the Court’s so-
lution as “a kind of First Amendment easement”). 
 263. Supra note 262.  
 264. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 964, 998 (2d. 
ed. 1988). 
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Court. Cyber or virtual forums with their egalitarian access cri-
teria would seem to undo the claim that economic power is a pre-
requisite for meaningful speech rights. Such forums are plenti-
ful, easy to access, and require little capital to reach a broad 
audience.265 One need only witness the effect of social media on 
movements like Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street, or the 
Arab Spring to understand the simultaneous power and equaliz-
ing force of new forums.266 
For its part, the Supreme Court and its lower-court brethren 
have spoken of forum restriction in terms of permissive content-
neutral regulation. The right to speak, decisions have reasoned, 
is not the same as the right to access any forum of speech.267 Ac-
cordingly, restrictions on access to forums—even public ones and 
those with a heritage of speech—are permissible provided that 
such restrictions are reasonably linked to legitimate government 
goals.268 
Despite the admitted difference between a post on Facebook 
and the March on Washington or a picket line, restrictions of fo-
rums present similar dualities with regard to speech rights. On 
the one hand, whether discussing a public or a private forum, 
the existence of the forum alone would not seem to point to a 
right to unfettered access. On the other hand, not all forums are 
created equal. As discussed above in the context of Hague, loca-
tion matters. To relegate speech to a particular forum or location 
based on the theory that the restriction is content neutral is to 
overlook the significance of the location to the speech’s func-
tion.269 In those cases, the formal regulation impedes the func-
tionality of the right. 
This reality problematizes the Supreme Court’s statement 
that if “ample alternative channels of communication” exist, 
then the state may engage in content-neutral regulation of the 
 
 265. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 
1996), aff ’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (“It is no exaggeration to conclude that the 
Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory market-
place of mass speech that this country—and indeed the world—has yet seen.”); 
Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 276–77 (2006). 
 266. See, e.g., Bijan Stephen, Social Media Helps Black Lives Matter Fight 
the Power, WIRED (Nov. 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives 
-matter-uses-social-media-to-fight-the-power. 
 267. See Balkin, supra note 241, at 398–400. 
 268. Id. at 401. 
 269. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 81. 
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speaker’s chosen forum of speech.270 First, this view would seem 
to undermine the notion of a “free marketplace of ideas,” where 
speakers are free to make autonomous choices about their 
speech. Second, it is premised on the notion that all locations for 
and methods of speaking are equal or at least reasonably fungi-
ble. Third, it seems to shift the focus away from what appears to 
be the relevant First Amendment inquiries, such as whether the 
regulation abridges the right to speak and whether the regula-
tion is necessary. 
It is hard to imagine a similar constitutional claim in other 
contexts. This type of analysis does occur in the context of crim-
inal procedure—if the Fourth Amendment was violated but the 
discovery of the evidence in question was inevitable, or if the at-
torney’s performance fell below the Sixth Amendment’s require-
ment of competent counsel but the outcome would have been the 
same for the defendant, then the claim is moot.271 No harm, no 
constitutional foul. In other contexts, however, such an analysis 
seems unimaginable.272 It seems that when individual liberties 
are at stake, actor autonomy matters and we as citizens do not 
forgo our rights simply because we are able to work around the 
government’s regulation, or because a court can imagine choices 
we might have made, but did not make, with regard to the exer-
cise of our rights. 
In the context of First Amendment, however, a content-neu-
tral restriction may survive, so long as the reviewing court can 
conclude that the speaker could have expressed his speech in a 
different way, regardless of the speaker’s own sentiments re-
garding the judicially identified alternative.273 This premise 
 
 270. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) (“[W]hen a content-neu-
tral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may 
satisfy the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or 
least intrusive means of serving the statutory goal.”). The concept of “ample 
alternative channels” actually originated in O’Brien. See United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 271. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440 (1984) (affirming inevitable 
discovery exception to the Fourth Amendment); Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 682 (1984) (requiring a showing of prejudice in ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims). 
 272. See Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative Channels” Flaw in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657, 1662–63 (2016) (noting for 
example that the due process clause would not be satisfied if plaintiff in same 
sex marriage litigation had been permitted to enjoy the same benefits of mar-
riage through civil union). 
 273. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (“[E]ven in a 
public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, 
place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified 
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seems oddly well accepted among most (though not all) First 
Amendment scholars.274 The logic of this acceptance seems to be 
that “a typical law aimed at non-communicative effects is un-
likely to excessively inhibit the communication of some view-
point of fact, because many different media would remain avail-
able to the speakers.”275 Put in terms of the marketplace of ideas, 
the content of the speech is not excluded from the market; it just 
must reach the market through some other, legal channel.276 The 
idea itself is still able to contribute to the communal dialog, so 
whatever harm the restriction visits upon the speaker is mini-
mal.277 
All this assumes, of course, that courts take seriously the 
analysis into the availability of alternative channels of commu-
nication and the effect of the restriction on the speech itself. Such 
assumption may not always be warranted. At a minimum, courts 
seem deaf to the claim that the speaker chose the particular 
mode of expression precisely because it was not equal but supe-
rior to other alternatives the court might find in retrospect. 
Forums, after all, are neither equal nor fungible. Critiques 
of protest zones at political conventions demonstrates this 
plainly. While such zones may permit free political speech, 
speech in the confined and often isolated space of the protest 
zones at the Democratic National Convention in 2008 are hardly 
the same as protests on the floor of the Convention in 1968.278 
They do not offer the same access nor do they marshal the same 
 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’” (quoting 
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))). 
 274. See C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade 
Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 937 
(1984) (noting that time, place, and manner restrictions that interfere with ex-
pressive conduct are nonetheless “possibly the most universally accepted tenet 
of first amendment doctrine”). But see Armijo, supra note 272, at 1668 (arguing 
that although the “ample alternative channels analysis was in its incipiency a 
misguided afterthought . . . the concept now carries dispositive force in First 
Amendment doctrine”). 
 275. See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Il-
legal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted 
Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1305 (2005). 
 276. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
46, 67 (1987). 
 277. Id. at 68. 
 278. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 81 (describing political convention des-
ignated protest zones as means of “banishing protestors from the vicinity” of the 
Democratic and Republican Conventions). 
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power to disrupt (or, if you prefer, to communicate). Not only are 
they isolated by their nature, but they undermine the very func-
tion of the speech they seek to contain. 
Cyber forums face equal challenges. While such forums may 
have a decided advantage in terms of cost and ease of dispersal 
over speech in the non-virtual world, they may restrict the mes-
sage and diminish its impact of at least some speech. First and 
foremost, cyber speech is not the same as a physical presence in 
the real world. This is not to discount its utility, but to recognize 
its difference. This difference is at times beneficial and at times 
hampering. Movements like the Arab Spring survived and grew 
thanks in part the ease of cyber speech.279 This movement, how-
ever, would not have had the same power if it lacked a live com-
ponent.280 There is a power to marching in the street that cannot 
be supplanted by even the cleverest of Facebook posts. 
Certainly the cyber world offers a variety of low-cost or no-
cost venues for speech and circumvents formal media constructs. 
Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, YouTube, Blogger, and even 
email servers are free. Courts are fond of pointing to these alter-
native channels of communication when upholding content-neu-
tral restrictions.281 But courts overlook the fact that, while the 
platform itself may be free, the devices and internet through 
which one may access such platforms are not.282 Admittedly, 
there may be a myriad of “free” access points, but these often 
carry their own distinct set of time, place, and manner re-
strictions that may limit speech.283 In this sense, their utility as 
an alternative channel of communication is limited. 
 
 279. See Ramesh Srinivasan, Taking Power Through Technology in the Arab 
Spring, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ 
2012/09/2012919115344299848.html (describing the role of social media in the 
Arab Spring by granting in particular access to formerly exclusive media out-
lets). 
 280. See Jessi Hempl, Social Media Made the Arab Spring but Couldn’t Save 
It, WIRED (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/social-media-made 
-the-arab-spring-but-couldnt-save-it (describing the limited value of social me-
dia in the Arab Spring movement). 
 281. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(finding that the ability to communicate protest messages through mass media 
qualified as a “viable alternative means . . . to enable protesters to communicate 
their messages to the delegates”). 
 282. Consider the bill my internet provider sends every month or the cost of 
the iPad Pro by Apple, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/shop/buy-ipad/ipad-pro 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (listing the iPad Pro starting at $799). 
 283. The New York City Public Library Internet Use Policy, for example, 
explains that the library filters internet content, blocking information deemed 
“inappropriate or offensive” and may limit the total amount of time a person 
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Beyond these basic limitations, these channels of communi-
cation carry with them their own content-regulation policies 
that, unlike government-based regulations, do not implicate 
First Amendment concerns because they are restrictions im-
posed by private rather than state actors.284 All of which leads to 
a final irony: in relying on such online platforms, the government 
justifies its own regulation of speech by relying on the private 
sector to provide a speech forum in a way that the public sector 
or other private actors are not willing to do. This seems an odd 
solution to a First Amendment concern. 
In this sense, whether considering online or more traditional 
forums of speech, the previously sensible proposition that a 
speaker may be entitled to speak but not entitled to choose 
where, when, or how he speaks seems less sensible. It under-
mines the speaker’s choice, it undermines his speech, and it is 
premised on a false proposition of equality. 
In the context of graffiti, this claim about the unique nature 
of the forum is especially salient. A critical component of graf-
fiti’s communicative nature is not only its message, but the illicit 
and physical components of its message.285 Graffiti may promote 
a neighborhood’s cultural identity or mark a particularly fraught 
or significant location. In these cases, there is no available alter-
native forum that permits communication of the message. The 
forum is the message. Restrictions on the time, place, or manner 
of the speech therefore is a regulation of the content of the speech 
itself. 
 
may utilize the free internet access. Policy on Public Use of the Internet, N.Y. 
PUB. LIBR., https://www.nypl.org/help/computers-internet-and-wireless-access/ 
policy-on-public-use-of-the-internet (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). 
 284. Facebook, for example, recently released a twenty-five page “Commu-
nity Standards” guideline that sets forth criteria to remove posts based on their 
content. Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
communitystandards (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). These standards are not new; 
as early as 2013 Facebook discussed removing “hate speech” from its social me-
dia platform. Controversial, Harmful and Hateful Speech on Facebook, FACE-
BOOK (May 28, 2013), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/ 
controversial-harmful-and-hateful-speech-on-facebook/574430655911054. 
These standards, however, are more restrictive than state regulation of speech 
including “hate speech.” 
 285. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  A FREE SPEECH DEFENSE OF GRAFFITI   
One way to address the concern that regulating graffiti sup-
presses already marginalized speech is to recognize an affirma-
tive free speech defense to graffiti crimes.286 An affirmative de-
fense of speech to criminalized graffiti serves three important 
functions. First, it acknowledges that there is a speech value in 
illicit speech such as graffiti and that such value is eroded or 
erased by regulations that deprioritize it. Second, an affirmative 
defense of speech rejects the claim that regulation based on 
something other than content does not, in fact, regulate content. 
Instead such a defense delves beneath the surface of such regu-
lations and considers their silencing effect on particular speak-
ers and particular messages. Finally, an affirmative defense of 
speech embeds decisions about the value of illicit or criminalized 
speech in the hands of the very citizens who hear (or perhaps 
suffer) the speech in the first place. Unlike the blanket decrimi-
nalization of graffiti, a speech-based defense allows members of 
the community—as jurors—to weigh speech values in the con-
text of an actual prosecution and actual speech. 
In each of these functions the underlying values of First 
Amendment doctrine are promoted. Acknowledging speech value 
in even the most marginal of voices and mechanisms ensures a 
vibrant and diverse marketplace in which contribution is possi-
ble regardless of property ownership or power. To unpack the 
effect of content-neutral regulation is to push not only First 
Amendment equality, but to preserve the liberty interests of 
speakers themselves. 
Admittedly, there are limits to the defense, and in many 
ways, it is an imperfect discretionary mechanism that may con-
tribute to, rather than ameliorate, the silencing effect of majori-
tarian positions on nonconforming, dissenting, and resistant 
speech. In this, an affirmative defense of speech to graffiti is no 
panacea. But it is a novel solution to a doctrinal regime that, to 
date, has ignored the speech possibility of graffiti. While imper-
fect, it is a start. 
 
 286. In criminal law, an affirmative defense is one that allows the defendant 
to claim that while the state may have proven the elements of the offense, some 
additional fact or factors should excuse or justify the defendant’s actions thereby 
mitigating or absolving his culpability. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. 
Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 
88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1345–57 (1979). 
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A. THE NATURE OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
Codified law is a blunt instrument. Criminal law is no ex-
ception. Once codified, criminal law is static and immobile—de-
fining regulated behavior before it occurs.287 To construct crimi-
nal law is therefore to make a best guess about the proper 
balance between the anticipated harm and the restrictions nec-
essary to prevent such harm. Left a static construct, criminal law 
can be clumsy and unruly. Unable to account for the nuance of 
real time existence, criminal law is tempered by discretionary 
moments that hone the law’s application. Most discretionary mo-
ments in criminal law happen on a formal level, as state-sanc-
tioned actors make choices that drive criminal law toward a just 
application or outcome. In the field, police choose which cases to 
investigate and whom to arrest.288 Prosecutors choose which 
charges to file, or not to file at all.289 Judges issue discretionary 
rulings that shape the narrative of cases or dismiss them out-
right.290 Other discretionary moments occur in informal con-
texts. Juries nullify verdicts in cases that offend their sense of 
what the law ought to be or how it should be applied,291 and af-
firmative defenses carve out exceptions to otherwise prohibited 
behavior.292  
 
 287. See Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury’s Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. 657, 661 
(2012) (describing the static nature of codified law). 
 288. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1713 
(2017) (noting the extent of police and prosecutorial discretion); Joseph Gold-
stein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Deci-
sions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 562 (1960) (examining 
how police decisions can drive or undermine a criminal case). 
 289. See Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: 
The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 495–507 (2017) (discussing 
the role of prosecutorial discretion in criminal law). See generally Note, Prose-
cutor’s Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955) (same). 
 290. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discre-
tion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1996–2001 (2007); Anna Roberts, Dismissals as 
Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 330–31 (2017). 
 291. See Carroll, supra note 287, at 695–96; Paul Butler, Jurors Need to Take 
the Law into Their Own Hands, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/04/05/jurors-need-to-take-the 
-law-into-their-own-hands (arguing that jurors serve a critical function of check-
ing problematic discretionary decisions by formal state actors); see also Paul 
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700–03 (1995). 
 292. George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
949, 954 (1985). For an example of a common affirmative defense, consider self-
defense which decriminalizes assault behavior in particular circumstances. See 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
(defining self-defense as justifiable use of force “when the actor believes that 
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As jurors contemplate an affirmative defense, they by neces-
sity weigh competing values and norms, judging when an actor 
should be insulated from liability and when he should suffer con-
viction. Admittedly this balancing is done within the context of 
formally constructed law. But whether through statutory edict 
or common law tradition, affirmative defenses ask jurors to con-
sider not only the behavior that is criminal, but some aspect be-
yond that behavior that might justify or excuse it.293 To consider, 
for example, the reasonableness of a response or the imminence 
of a threat in the context of an affirmative defense of self-de-
fense294 is to define these terms in the context of the juror’s own 
lived experiences.295 It is to ask a juror to choose between the 
competing narratives of the prosecution and defense and to cast 
a verdict based not only on which rings most true, but on which 
version of the world the juror believes ought to exist.296 In this, 
the weighing of an affirmative defense in a criminal case is a 
moment of direct democracy on a small scale. In a jury room, 
twelve ordinary citizens construct and interpret the law in the 
context of a particular case and their own aspirations of what 
the law ought to be.297 
 
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself 
against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion”). 
 293. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (noting the historic 
tradition of affirmative defenses, as well as the defendant’s burden under such 
defenses); Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 
COLUM. L. REV 527, 543–47 (1955). Unlike general defenses, affirmative de-
fenses place a burden on the defense to both acknowledge criminal action and 
offer some justification or excuse for such action. See Ronald J. Allen, Structur-
ing Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Approach to Evidentiary 
Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 326 (1980) (“[For] affirmative defenses, the place-
ment of burdens of production, judicial comment on the evidence, shifts in bur-
dens of persuasion or production by presumptive language . . . , and permissive 
inferences . . . are [all] primarily . . . method[s] of allocating burdens of persua-
sion on the relevant factual issues in a criminal case.”). See generally Paul H. 
Robinson et al., The American Criminal Code: General Defenses, 7 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 37 (Spring 2015) (providing a comprehensive overview of defenses in 
all states). 
 294. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 
1962). 
 295. See Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 579, 586 
(2014). See generally LEE, supra note 23 (describing the role of citizen jurors’ 
experiences in evaluating defenses and criminal charges). 
 296. Carroll, supra note 295, at 585. 
 297. See Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 831–
32 (2015). 
  
1344 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1285 
 
B. AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF SPEECH FOR GRAFFITI 
Any potential affirmative defense of free speech requires the 
jury to weigh the apparent value of the speech itself against any 
competing interests. Jurors already do this in obscenity and po-
litical speech cases, in which they consider the speech in ques-
tion and the value such speech brings to the community.298 A 
topless dancer may continue to perform not because she is espe-
cially good, but because her expressive act carries a modicum of 
redeeming value to the community.299 A protestor may burn his 
own flag,300 or wear his “fuck the draft” jacket,301 not because the 
majority of citizens finds his message or his mechanism of com-
munication compelling, but because they find a value in the dis-
senting speech itself that outweighs the interests that might si-
lence it.302 Whether weighing a content-based regulation or a 
regulation based on a time, place, or manner restriction, a juror 
can determine where the speech in question lies on a continuum 
of social values. 
To place the decision-making process regarding the speech 
value of graffiti in the hands of the jury through the proposed 
affirmative defense is to reconfigure the balance of power be-
tween formal law and the citizens who live under the law.303 Dis-
cretionary decisions occur on a daily basis in formal corridors as 
police, prosecutors, and judges decide which cases should pro-
ceed and how.304 They occur less frequently in informal spheres 
such as jury nullification.305 The value of an affirmative defense 
lies in part in its ability to regularize such informal discretion by 
attaching elements and proof requirements to claims of legal ex-
ception.306 If the fear of jury nullification is that it will produce 
 
 298. See supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text. 
 299. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 126–27 (1972). 
 300. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414–19 (1989). 
 301. See California v. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15, 19–22 (1971). 
 302. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408–09 (relying on community norms to judge 
obscenity or inciting speech); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24–26 (same). 
 303. See Carroll, supra note 295, at 583, 595 (arguing that citizens are at 
times better able to calibrate law than formal actors). 
 304. See Carroll, supra note 287, at 696 n.200. 
 305. See Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1997). 
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lawlessness or unequal application of law,307 the affirmative de-
fense accomplishes the goal of permitting citizens to push the 
construction of law while offering guidelines for such behavior. 
In terms of First Amendment rhetoric, an affirmative de-
fense of speech adheres to a vision of democracy based on an open 
exchange of ideas and a free debate of values that occurs both in 
formal spheres of government, but also in the informal sphere of 
the citizenry.308 Such a defense fills a critical gap in current First 
Amendment analysis of illicit speech by asking jurors to consider 
the expressive value of the graffiti in the face of the damage it 
may cause. In this balancing, the citizens of the communities 
most affected by graffiti are empowered to calibrate its worth.309 
A citizen juror who believes that graffiti is blight may reject 
the defense. That same juror may recognize that a mural that 
unites a community matters more than the wall that the mural 
occupies. Or the juror may simply prefer to avoid the suppression 
of the dissenting speech that a conviction may produce. Like-
wise, the juror may consider a tag that marks the existence of a 
now dispersed population as carrying a value that is otherwise 
lost in a formal world focused on urban revitalization and gate-
way-offense policing.310 Or the juror may view the tag as a warn-
ing that undermines the community and as such is not speech 
worth defending.311 In short, the affirmative defense of speech 
for graffiti would undo the current rote calculus that the value 
of property always outweighs the value of illicit speech.312 If pre-
sented, the defense would ask jurors to consider which speech 
warrants criminalization, and which speech deserves to be left 
free of government regulation or, in the alternative, which gov-
ernment regulations exceed the permissible curtailment of 
speech. 
Constructing an affirmative defense of speech for graffiti 
has the additional benefit of allowing the accused to choose 
whether or not to assert the defense. Defendants who wish to 
maintain the defiance component of their speech act may decline 
 
 307. See Brown, supra note 305, at 1173–94 (recognizing and disputing such 
claims); Carroll, supra note 295, at 621–34 (same). 
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 311. See supra notes 89, 95–105 and accompanying text. 
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to assert the defense. For these defendants, the value of the me-
dium of graffiti may be diluted by the existence of the defense, 
and they may opt to preserve their speech as an act of rebellion 
that is criminal rather than a potentially permissible act. Like-
wise, some defendants may accept that their graffiti, though 
speech, carries no particular meaning for the community and de-
cline to assert the defense. That some may not assert the defense 
does not suggest that the defense is insufficient or irrelevant, but 
rather that it both maintains the autonomy of the accused and 
serves a critical honing function for the law. 
Finally, an affirmative defense offers the defendant some 
control over the narrative of the case. Like all affirmative de-
fenses, an affirmative defense of speech in a graffiti case would 
carry some burden of persuasion for the defendant.313 Unlike a 
defense that merely challenges the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s 
case, the affirmative defense would require the defendant to pro-
duce evidence of the value of the graffiti-based speech in an effort 
to establish and prove the defense.314 On the one hand, this per-
suasion requirement may preclude the defense for some defend-
ants, but it will also limit the rote use of the defense.315 Those 
defendants who are able to meet the proof requirements would, 
of course, be bound to meet the elemental requirements of the 
defense as codified, but in doing so they would push the law to 
recognize and legitimate their contrarian claim.316 In this sense, 
regardless of its potential for success, the affirmative defense 
opens a space for a story criminal law currently neglects.317 
C. LIMITS TO THE DEFENSE 
Like all defenses that rely on community interpretation, an 
affirmative defense of speech risks reduction to the lowest com-
mon denominators of valued speech.318 Just as a community may 
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accept or reject the perceived imminence of a threat in the face 
of a self-defense claim, the community may reject the notion that 
the speech interests contained in graffiti outweigh the damage 
the graffiti does to property interests small or large. An affirma-
tive defense’s proof requirement only aggravates this reality. A 
person likely to be chosen as a juror may also be more likely to 
align herself with a property owner who laments the damage 
graffiti causes or the lawless message it sends.319 The commu-
nity may accept that to criminalize graffiti may silence some 
speakers, but nonetheless reject the defense believing either that 
such speech lacks value or that its mechanism of communication 
is not worthy of protection. Depending on the composition of the 
jury, some graffitied messages may resonate with community 
values and others may not. In this, the defense of speech that 
relies on community valuation of graffiti may ironically promote 
content discrimination that First Amendment jurisprudence 
prohibits, even in cases where content-neutral regulation con-
trols the speech. 
Further, an affirmative defense of graffiti in a criminal con-
text would not prevent a property owner from either seeking civil 
remedies for the damage caused by the graffiti or from engaging 
in the self-help remedy of removing graffiti from private prop-
erty. The defense therefore provides limited cover for dissenting 
speech. It does not offer, at least in the context of private prop-
erty, a guaranteed platform for speech, but only protection from 
governmental interference in the form of a criminal conviction. 
In public forums, the defense would arguably carry more protec-
tion, though even this may be limited, as described above. 
In this sense, an affirmative defense of speech for graffiti 
charges, like any affirmative defense is imperfect. Such a de-
fense is limited both in terms of the cover it provides and the 
situations in which it may reasonably be expected to apply. 
Nonetheless, such a defense creates an important, and now ab-
sent, shelter for dissenting speech by recognizing the potential 
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value of graffiti even in the face of the property damage it causes. 
Further, the defense vests this evaluation in the hands of com-
munity members – the men and women who live in the midst of 
the very speech they are asked to judge. This in turn enforces a 
bottom up democratic process that seems somehow poetically fit-
ting for street speech such as graffiti. 
  CONCLUSION   
It is easy for criminal law to dismiss the speech value of graf-
fiti. Crafted as outsider speech, graffiti at its very moment of cre-
ation is an act of defiance. It is regulated as property damage or 
as a public nuisance and resigned to an ignoble place in the 
canon of the First Amendment. Yet this construction of graffiti 
as wholly outside of the realm of free speech’s notice overlooks 
the value of graffiti. 
In the end, there can be no question that graffiti damages 
property. There can be no question that graffiti disrupts the 
carefully constructed lines of accepted forums and constitution-
ally permissible regulation. But there can also be no question 
that for all its disruption, graffiti sometimes carries with it the 
voice and identity of marginalized and powerless speakers. Re-
gardless of its presentation, graffiti pushes back on accepted no-
tions of forums of speech and communication itself. In an emerg-
ing political world in which access to speech pivots around a 
fulcrum of money, power, and polite acts of dissent, graffiti re-
mains an ever defiant and street savvy actor. Graffiti challenges 
the notion that time, place, or manner regulations do not also 
regulate content. Instead graffiti remains true to its creation—
defiant of the cabined constructs of First Amendment doctrine 
that reject the communicative value of an illicit scrawl. 
This Article maintains that to promote the values of the 
First Amendment—whether in terms of equality or in terms of 
liberty—is to carve a protected space for graffiti in criminal law. 
An affirmative defense of graffiti not only recognizes the speech 
issues at stake in the regulation of graffiti, but allows decisions 
about the value of graffiti to occur in the very community in 
which the graffiti appears. In this, this Article lays claim to the 
dual nature of illicit speech—acknowledging the harm it may 
cause, that law currently regulates, while simultaneously em-
bracing its empowering nature. Both aspects are worthy of the 
law’s attention. 
 
